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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND HEALTHCARE REFORM: THE
MEDICARE PART D ”CLAWBACK” EXAMPLE
ELIZABETH A. WEEKS*

I. INTRODUCTION
In spring 2006, several states petitioned the United States Supreme
Court to hear a challenge under its original jurisdiction to one piece of the
new Medicare Part D prescription drug law.1 Before Part D implementation,
individuals who qualified for both Medicare and Medicaid received their
prescription drug coverage through state Medicaid programs.2 Part D
requires these dually eligible beneficiaries to enroll in the new federal
Medicare program instead of state Medicaid programs for drug coverage.3
This legislation gave the federal government control over prescription drug
coverage for dually eligible beneficiaries but requires states perpetually to
pay most of the cost of those beneficiaries’ drugs.4
The “phased-down state contribution,” or “clawback,” is a unique
example of cooperative federalism.5 The federal government claimed credit

* Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. This Article would not have been
possible without the other authors, editors, organizers of and signatories to the Professors’
Amicus Brief in Texas v. Leavitt: Nicole Huberfeld, Ted Marmor, Steve Calandrillo, Molly
Wood, Mark Walters, Carla Cox, Christopher Murgica, Sean Jordan, Adam Aston, and Bill
Davis. I am also indebted to Rick Levy, Rob Glicksman, Steve McAllister, Steve Ware, Mike
Wells, Jack Preis, and Frank Thompson for comments on earlier drafts of the Brief and this
Article and to my research assistants, Laura Ward, Neal Johnson, and Eunice Lee for their
tireless assistance.
1. See generally Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Supporting Brief, and Bill of
Complaint, Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S.Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.) (No. 135) [hereinafter States’
Brief]. The Petitioner States were Texas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, and New Jersey.
2. See Daniel A. Cody, Trouble on the Horizon? Medicare Part D and Dual Eligibles, 18
HEALTH LAWYER 27, 27 (2005).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 28.
5. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815,
815 n.2 (1998) (citing “voluminous literature” on “cooperative federalism” and suggesting
that this approach to policymaking “offers us a vision of independent governments working
together to implement federal policy”); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism,
79
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for expanding Medicare to cover prescription drugs and retained
administrative and budgetary control over the new program.6 States,
meanwhile, were left footing the bill for the federal programs but were
denied any control, discretion, or ability to respond to constituents’ concerns
about their state budget appropriations for the new program’s cost.7 In
effect, the clawback requires states to allocate an undeterminable amount of
their state budgets to fund a fully federal program. In challenging the
clawback, the States’ U.S. Supreme Court Petition raised various
constitutional arguments, including intergovernmental tax immunity, anticommandeering, and the Guarantee Clause.8 The States also asserted
grounds on which the Court should take the unusual step of exercising
original jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.9 Specifically, the States urged
that the potentially staggering and immediate state budgetary impact of the
clawback necessitated a speedy and final resolution of the issues.10
The 2007 Saint Louis University Health Law Symposium offered a unique
opportunity to examine a wide range of issues raised by the implementation
of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
(the MMA).11 The MMA effected the largest expansion of Medicare since
the program began, including, most notably, outpatient prescription drug
coverage.12 Some contributions to this Symposium provided broad policy
perspectives on the landmark legislation and its effect on beneficiaries,
providers, taxpayers, insurers, and the public. This Article, by contrast,
offers a focused examination of a relatively minor, and perhaps largely
overlooked, funding provision. The clawback is significant, nonetheless,
because it represents a unique approach to shared responsibility between

the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 205 (1997)
(describing “cooperative federalism” and Congress’s historical reliance on states “to
implement the goals and controls of federal policy”); Symposium on Cooperative Federalism:
Foreword, 23 IOWA L. REV. 455, 456 (1938) (discussing recent “experimentation in
federalism” through legislation “characterized by the participation of several governments in
cooperative legislative or administrative action”).
6. See Press Release, John Lynch, Governor of N.H., Governor Announces New
Hampshire Joins Other States in Challenging Medicare “Clawback” Provision (Mar. 3, 2006),
at www.nh.gov/governor/news/2006/030306clawback.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
7. William G. Weissert & Edward A. Miller, Punishing the Pioneers: The Medicare
Modernization Act and State Pharmacy Assistance Programs, 35 PUBLIUS 115, 139-40 (2005).
8. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 5-20.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id. at 21.
11. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. IV 2004)).
12. Rick Mayes, Medicare and America’s Healthcare System in Transition: From the
Death of Managed Care to the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and Beyond, 38 J.
HEALTH L. 391, 393 (2005).
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the federal and state governments but lacks the hallmarks of cooperative
and consensual federalism.13 It was highly objectionable to many states,
spawning constitutional U.S. Supreme Court litigation.14 I, together with
several other health law professors and practitioners, submitted an amicus
brief in support of the States’ Petition.15 Although the Supreme Court
declined to hear the States’ challenge to this unprecedented funding
mechanism,16 the clawback remains constitutionally suspect and presents
important questions for cooperative state-federal health reform.
II. PART D OF THE MMA
In 2003, Congress enacted the MMA,17 adding, for the first time since
the program began in 1965, coverage for outpatient prescription drugs.18
The absence of outpatient prescription drug coverage under Medicare was
a relic of the political and medical climate in which the program was
envisioned.19 Medicare was originally intended to cover catastrophic, rather
than routine, healthcare costs, much like a true insurance plan.20 The
program’s core components, Part A for hospital services and Part B for
physician services, were based roughly on the early Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans, which did not cover prescription drugs.21 In addition,
pharmaceutical research and the importance of pharmacotherapy in disease
treatment were relatively rudimentary when Medicare began.22 The lack of

13. See generally Sarnoff, supra note 5 (discussing cooperative federalism).
14. States’ Brief, supra note 1.
15. Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Health Law as Amici Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs, Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S. Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.) (No. 135) [hereinafter Professors’
Brief].
16. Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S.Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.).
17. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. IV 2004)).
18. See Thomas R. Barker, The Low-Income Subsidy in the New Medicare Drug Benefit, 1
J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 49, 50-52 (2005) (summarizing historical Medicare drug
coverage); Susan A. Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003: Will it be Good Medicine for U.S. Health Policy?, 14 ELDER L.J.
237, 241 (2006) (noting historical lack of outpatient drug benefit).
19. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 10-15,
371-72 (1997) (describing historical background and political compromises required for
passage of Medicare program).
20. See Thomas R. Oliver et al., A Political History of Medicare and Prescription Drug
Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283, 290-91 (2004) (discussing the initial Democratic and
Republican proposals for a senior health insurance plan and the ultimate adoption of
Medicare, which provided hospital insurance and supplementary medical insurance).
21. Channick, supra note 18, at 241 n.18; ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 19, at 14-15.
22. See Shannon Cadres, The Citizens Health Prescription: Coping with Rising Drug
Costs, 18 NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL’Y 49, 51 (2002) (noting that Medicare’s lack of outpatient
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Medicare coverage for outpatient drugs became increasingly conspicuous
as drug therapy became an essential intervention and the standard of care
for many diseases and chronic conditions.23 Moreover, most other insurers,
including many private health insurance and managed care plans as well as
Medicaid, the government indigent healthcare program, covered
prescription drugs.24 Finally, with much fanfare, Congress extended
Medicare coverage to prescription drugs under Medicare Part D.25
A little-noticed and last-minute addition to the Part D federal drug plan
requires states to pay a portion of the costs of the new benefit.26 This
provision, dubbed the “phased-down state contribution” in the statute, and
commonly referred to as the clawback, demands state payments for a
federal benefit.27 If a state fails to remit the required clawback amount, the
federal government will automatically offset the amount demanded, plus
interest, against the federal dollars otherwise due to the state under the
Medicaid program.28
The combination of the Part D clawback and automatic offset effects an
unprecedented change in the core funding and administrative structures of
two distinct government programs: Medicare and Medicaid. Medicare,
since its enactment, has been a fully federal program.29 Because of the Part
D clawback, a substantial portion of the program now is funded by state
contributions.30 The clawback also alters Medicaid, a government welfare
drug coverage “went virtually unnoticed” in 1965, “when prescription drugs were a relatively
small part of overall healthcare costs not typically covered by private insurance plans”).
23. See id. at 51-52 (quoting a Massachusetts pharmaceutical industry source as stating
that “[p]harmaceuticals are about 10 percent of healthcare spending, but they are probably
about 70 percent of the cure”).
24. See Oliver et al., supra note 20, at 285, 291, & 293 (noting that Medicare’s
omission of a drug benefit “prompted the development of other sources of coverage,”
including Medicaid and private insurance).
25. See generally The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. IV
2004)).
26. Louise M. Slaughter, Medicare Part D – The Product of a Broken Process, 354 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2314, 2314-15 (2006) (describing conference committee deliberations and the
3:00 a.m. vote, including a provision requiring “[s]tates, already overburdened by health care
costs, . . . to partially fund Part D”).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2004); Channick, supra note 18, at 24546 (“The MMA contains a provision, colloquially known as the ‘clawback,’ that essentially
requires the states to subsidize a benefit granted to Medicare beneficiaries by federal
legislation, administered by federal agencies, and operated by private-sector entities.”); Cody,
supra note 2, at 28 (describing clawback).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C).
29. See Judith Feder et al., Long-Term Care in the United States: An Overview, 19
HEALTH AFF. 40, 48 (2000).
30. See Cody, supra note 2, at 28.
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program that gives federal financial support to states that voluntarily
establish and administer their own programs, as long as the programs
comply with certain federal requirements.31 The effect of the clawback and
automatic offset penalty is that states must comply with an onerous, new
condition on federal Medicaid dollars. Specifically, they must perpetually
fund a portion of Medicare, a distinct and separate federal program that is
wholly out of states’ fiscal, administrative, and legislative control, in order to
receive the full federal Medicaid contribution.

A. Overview of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs
Medicare is a fully federal program that provides health insurance to
elderly, disabled, and end-stage renal disease patients.32 Medicare covers
hospital services under Part A33 and physician services under Part B.34 The
new Part D adds coverage for outpatient prescription drugs,35 which the
program never before covered.36 Medicare is funded from mandatory
payroll taxes, federal general revenue, and beneficiary-paid premiums and
deductibles.37 States, traditionally, have had no fiscal responsibility for or
administration over the federal Medicare program.38
Congress enacted Medicaid at the same time as Medicare, intending
Medicaid to be a welfare program to provide healthcare to the needy,
including individuals impoverished by staggeringly high medical expenses.39
Medicaid is a joint state-federal program that accords states considerable

31. Kenneth R. Wiggins, Medicaid and the Enforceable Right to Receive Medical
Assistance: The Need for a Definition of “Medical Assistance”, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1487,
1489-90 (2006).
32. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Medicare: Medicare Eligibility Tool (2007),
at
www.medicare.gov/MedicareEligibility/Home.asp?dest=NAV|Home|GeneralEnrollment
#TabTop (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to i-5 (2000).
34. Id. §§ 1395j to w-4.
35. Id. §§ 1395w-101 to w-152 (Supp. IV 2004).
36. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 134 n.50 (describing the new Medicare Part
D, original Parts A and B, and Part C managed care model).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395e, 1395s (2000); id. § 1395r (Supp. IV 2004); id.§ 401
(Supp. IV 2004).
38. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 374-75 (1982)
(discussing the original structure of Medicare and the federal government’s fiscal
responsibilities).
39. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1981) (describing enactment
of Medicaid program); Brogan v. Miller, 537 F. Supp. 139, 142 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Channick,
supra note 18, at 273 (describing history of Medicaid); Sara Rosenbaum et al., Public Health
Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution from Medicaid to SCHIP, 1 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 7-8 (2004) (characterizing Medicaid as “an ‘afterthought’ to Medicare, and
a ‘relegation’ to states of responsibility for insuring the poor”).
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discretion over eligibility requirements and program benefits.40 The federal
Medicaid statute requires states to cover certain beneficiaries and services,
but states can expand eligibility and services beyond the federal
requirements.41 Eligibility, which also varies by state, is generally based on
income and/or medical condition or other “categorical” eligibility
requirements.42 As long as states comply with certain broad federal
requirements, they receive federal matching dollars to support their state
Medicaid programs.43 Each dollar a state spends on federally approved
Medicaid programs, whether required or optional, is matched by federal
funds on a percentage basis determined by the state’s relative poverty.44 At
the time the MMA was passed, all states operated Medicaid programs and
provided some level of outpatient prescription drug coverage, even though
the federal Medicaid statute does not require states to provide that benefit.45
Medicare eligibility is tied to Social Security pension eligibility and is
based on statutorily defined requirements of prior employment or current
disability.46 Medicare eligibility and benefits are not based on income.47 In
other words, Medicare does not means test; rich and poor beneficiaries
qualify on the same terms and receive the same benefits. It was never

40. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 39, at 7-8 (noting that “Medicaid is the largest
surviving public means-tested legal entitlement” and “entitles states to open-ended federal
financial assistance for the cost of dozens of classes of federally recognized health services
furnished to eligible and enrolled persons”).
41. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A
Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 857 (1990) (noting that “[b]ecause states
have great flexibility . . . the Medicaid program is really 50 very different programs serving
different populations and providing different benefits”).
42. See Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 37 (describing “categorically” and “medically” needy
beneficiaries); Kinney, supra note 41, at 865-68 (describing Medicaid eligibility); Sara
Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit Reduction
Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 12-13 (2006) (describing Medicaid eligibility and
coverage); Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
7, 17-19 (2001) (same).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2000) (regarding payments to states).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (describing
“cooperative federalism” approach enacted “to provide federal financial assistance for all
legitimate state expenditures under an approved Medicaid plan”).
45. See Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications
for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 445 (2008) (noting that
“states historically have covered drug expenses for dual eligibles through Medicaid”); Weissert
& Miller, supra note 7, at 118 (“Although it is an optional benefit, all states have elected to
provide at least some level of pharmaceutical coverage under Medicaid.”); Richard Cauchi,
State’s Rx for Medicare Gaps, ST. LEGISLATURES, Mar. 2006, at 28,28 (describing states’
programs to fill prescription drug gap in federal Medicare program).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 426(a)-(b) (2000).
47. See id.
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intended as a welfare program for needy people, but rather, as a pension
and health insurance program for workers.48 The MMA, however, changed
Medicare’s fundamental parity notion by adding lower-end means testing
for Part D drug plan subsidies and upper-end means testing for Part B
physician service premiums.49 For the first time since the program’s
enactment, poor Medicare beneficiaries may be eligible for additional
government support while wealthy beneficiaries may pay more than others
for the care that they receive.
Under the MMA, Medicare beneficiaries may also receive different
outpatient prescription drug coverage, depending on which plan they
elect.50 The Bush administration’s idea was for private health plans to
compete for program beneficiaries as a way of promoting cost containment
and quality through market principles.51 To succeed in offering choices and
promoting competition among plans, the new program had to attract a
number of private health plans to participate.52 To make the program
attractive to private health plans, the administration had to enroll a sufficient
volume of beneficiaries.53
48. See Channick, supra note 18, at 258-59 (noting that prior to Medicare, it was
uncommon for employers to set up health insurance for retired workers, and Medicare was
thus “intended to ensure access to health insurance for the retired elderly who have few other
options.”)
49. Timothy S. Jost, The Most Important Health Care Legislation of the Millenium (So
Far): The Medicare Modernization Act, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 437, 445 (2005).
50. See Barker, supra note 18, at 54 (describing unique Part D benefit delivery through
private insurers, unlike traditional Medicare delivery through federal agency).
51. See Channick, supra note 18, at 243 n.28 (describing private market underpinnings
of Part D benefit); Robert Dodge, Bush’s Free-Market Medicare Plan Draws Fire from
Democrats: Drug Benefits, HMO and PPO Proposals Offered, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March
5, 2003, at 4A (describing a competitive model in which “beneficiaries force providers to offer
their best coverage at the lowest prices with competing plans” and noting the Democrats’
questioning of the Administration’s suggestion that free-market forces will contain costs);
Christopher Snowbeck, Medicare Drug Plan Brings More Choices: Health-Care Competition
Gets Hot as Prescription Program Gets Set to Begin, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, June 23, 2005,
at E1 (describing private plans’ strategies to attract seniors to new Part D plans).
52. See Robert Pear, In Medicare Debate, Massaging the Facts, N.Y TIMES, May 23,
2006, at A21 (“The number of prescription drug plans – 40 or more in most states – has far
exceeded expectations. Premiums are lower than expected, partly because insurers obtained
larger discounts in negotiations with drug manufacturers.”). But see William M. Welch,
Medicare Measure Becomes Law Today, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 2003, at 14A (noting that plan
“relies on untested assumptions that private insurers will step in to provide subsidized
policies”).
53. See generally Peter B. Bach & Mark B. McClellan, The First Months of the
Prescription-Drug Benefit – A CMS Update, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2312 (2006)
(summarizing plan choices and enrollment numbers, including dual-eligibles, and noting that
“[o]f the [forty-two] million beneficiaries eligible for drug coverage, more than [thirty-one]
million were enrolled in a plan by early May 2006”).
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Part D enrollment is optional for most Medicare beneficiaries.54 Those
who elect to enroll pay a premium and can choose from a variety of plans,
For some Medicare
including a government-provided option.55
beneficiaries, however, Part D enrollment is not optional. Beneficiaries who
meet both Medicare and Medicaid eligibility requirements, called dual
eligibles, must enroll in Part D.56 As discussed above, before the MMA all
states covered outpatient drugs under their Medicaid plans. But Part D
mandated that all dually eligible beneficiaries switch from their existing state
Medicaid drug plans to the new federal Part D drug plans.57 The
justification for the clawback, it seems, is that states would not be in any
different position since they were already paying those drug costs. Now they
would just pay the federal government, rather than their Medicaid
pharmaceutical providers, the same amount; nothing gained and nothing
lost.58 From the federal government’s perspective, pulling all dual-eligibles
into Part D would increase the beneficiary rolls and attract plans to compete
for the enrollees’ drug plan dollars.59

B.

The Clawback’s Impact

The reality of the mandated switch is that the federal government took
administrative control of the new drug benefit for dually eligible beneficiaries
while leaving the states with the burden of paying for the drugs. The MMA
clawback is an unprecedented funding mechanism that requires states to
perpetually pay the bulk of dually eligibles’ drug costs.60 The amount of

54. Cody, supra note 2, at 27.
55. See id.
56. Id. (estimating that 7.5 million Medicaid beneficiaries are dually eligible and account
for 40% of all Medicaid spending); see also Rehab. Ass’n. of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d
1444, 1447 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The Medicaid and Medicare statutes intersect for coverage of
the population of the disabled or people 65 or over (eligible for Medicare) who are also poor
(eligible for Medicaid). These people are called dual eligibles or crossovers.”); Channick,
supra note 18, at 245 (discussing mandatory enrollment for dual eligibles); Huberfeld, supra
note 45 (describing mandatory enrollment for dual eligibles).
57. Channick, supra note 18, at 245.
58. See Huberfeld, supra note 45 (describing the clawback).
59. See Channick, supra note 18, at 243 n.28 (discussing the administration’s beliefs
about involving private insurers in Medicare); see also KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., DUAL ELIGIBLES: MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR LOWINCOME MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (July 2005), available at www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/
4091-04%20final(v2).pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (discussing the number of dual eligibles
and why Medicare beneficiaries need Medicaid).
60. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 136 (describing the “clawback” and
suggesting that a “major source of financing for the new plan is ‘clawback’ payments imposed
on the states by the MMA”).
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each state’s contribution to the federal benefit is based on states’ historical
spending on Medicaid prescription drugs.61
In eleventh-hour amendments to the MMA, intended to address the Part
D budget overrun,62 Congress required states to pay 90% of dually eligible
beneficiaries’ drug costs in 2006, the program’s first year.63 The state
contribution “phases down” to 75% for the year 2015 and will remain at
that level permanently.64 While states’ primary fiscal responsibility for drug
costs phases down, it never phases out. Furthermore, despite their funding
responsibility, states have no administrative control over the federal
prescription drug formulary, Medicare eligibility, clawback calculation and
assessment, or any other aspect of Medicare program administration.65 In
addition, the MMA provides no method for states to review, appeal, or
object to the clawback amount. If states fail or refuse to pay, the MMA
authorizes the payment due to be extracted through an automatic offset
against federal Medicaid funds to which states are otherwise are entitled.66
The automatic offset effectively means that states cannot choose whether to
participate in the cooperative funding approach to Part D. The clawback
operates as a mandatory, permanent excise on states to support a federal
public benefits program.
III. THE STATES’ CHALLENGE
Concerned about the potentially enormous budgetary impact of the
clawback and its distortion of state and federal powers, several states sought

61. Id.; see also Cody, supra note 2, at 28 (some states estimated that they would pay
more under the Part D clawback than historical Medicaid drug costs); Channick, supra note
18, at 275 (noting that CBO estimated states’ contribution toward MMA in the first five years
at $50 billion, or 13% of program costs).
62. The Bush Administration promised that Part D could be enacted for $400 billion. In
2005, the White House released budget figures estimating that Part D will cost more than
$1.2 trillion in the next decade. Ceci Connolly & Mike Allen, Medicare Drug Benefit May
Cost $1.2 Trillion; Estimate Dwarfs Bush's Original Price Tag, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2005, at
A1; see also Channick, supra note 18, at 238 (noting that Senator Edward Kennedy “freely
admitted that the $400 billion is merely a down payment on the cost of providing a
prescription drug benefit to Medicare beneficiaries”); Dodge, supra note 51 (noting that many
healthcare analysts “questioned whether the $400 billion for prescription drugs and freemarket forces would be enough, predicting Congress would have to find other ways to contain
Medicare costs”).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(5) (Supp. IV 2004); see also Weissert & Miller, supra note 7,
at 136 (discussing the initial and future percentages of costs that states are responsible for
under the clawback).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(5).
65. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 140.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004).
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to have the clawback struck down on constitutional grounds.67 Given the
utter unpredictability of the payment demand, with first payments coming
due in October 2006 and no means to appeal the amount demanded, the
five Petitioner States—Texas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, and New Jersey—
decided to seek immediate review of the clawback in the U.S. Supreme
Court.68 Several other states—Arizona, Alaska, Connecticut, Kansas,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Vermont—filed a supporting amicus brief,69 essentially reiterating the
Petitioner States’ arguments.

A. Original Jurisdiction
The States’ Petition presented one jurisdictional and three substantive
arguments. As a threshold matter, the States had to establish grounds for
the Court to exercise original jurisdiction, an exceptional practice by the
Court70 and arguably strategic error by a petitioner. But the States’ stakes
were utterly unpredictable and potentially staggering. The clawback
formula, its calculation, and payment demand are completely within federal
control and the statute provides no method of appeal or challenge to the
payment demand. Accordingly, it seemed imperative to leapfrog lower
court litigation and challenge the clawback definitively in the Supreme Court
before the first payments were calculated and due on October 15, 2006.
The two grounds for Supreme Court original jurisdiction that the States
had to establish were the “seriousness and dignity” of the States’ interest71
and the lack of an adequate alternative forum.72 The States argued that the
clawback raises serious constitutional questions regarding federal intrusion
into essential state functions, namely, the budgetary process.73 They urged
67. Channick, supra note 18, at 276-77 (describing States’ litigation); Cauchi, supra
note 45, at 30 (quoting Wyoming State Senator Charles Scott, “Don’t underestimate the
degree of resentment that the ‘clawback’ has wrought. It’s wide and it’s deep, and I think it’s
going to cause widespread litigation.”); Huberfeld, supra note 45, at 483–86 (describing
States’ litigation and summarizing arguments).
68. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 20-27.
69. Brief of the States of Arizona, Alaska, Connecticut, Kansas, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Vermont as Amici Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs, Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S.Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.) (No. 135) [hereinafter States’
Amicus Brief].
70. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see, e.g., South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 370, 382
(1984) (exercising original jurisdiction to review constitutionality of Internal Revenue Code
provision limiting exemption for interest earned on some state bonds).
71. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); see also Mississippi v.
Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992).
72. United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973); see also Mississippi, 506 U.S.
at 77.
73. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 11-14.
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that the clawback could impose a staggering budgetary impact on states
and the statute provides no way to appeal the payment demand.74
Furthermore, no adequate alternative forum existed that could provide
timely, final resolution of the issue, especially because the clawback was
already in operation and payments were quickly coming due.75

B.

Substantive Arguments

In addition to the jurisdictional argument, the States presented three
constitutional grounds for striking down the clawback: violation of
intergovernmental tax immunity, violation of state sovereignty by
commandeering state regulatory powers for federal functions, and violation
of the Guarantee Clause. Essentially, each of the constitutional claims is
grounded in federalism and the Framers’ structural protections to prevent
the federal government from encroaching on state sovereignty.
1. Intergovernmental Tax Immunity
The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine provides that the federal
government cannot tax states qua states.76 For this argument, the States
relied on New York v. United States,77 involving a state’s challenge to a
federal tax on sales of spring water. The rationale for the intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine is that requiring states to pay taxes to the federal
government interferes with a core state function and state sovereignty.78 Just
as the federal government cannot tax states, states cannot tax
instrumentalities of the federal government.79 The doctrine derives from
McCulloch v. Maryland, which famously recognized that “the power to tax
involves the power to destroy.”80 Applying this doctrine to the clawback, the
Petitioner States argued that setting state budgets is a core state function
that is violated by requiring states to remit an undeterminable amount to the
federal government each year.81 In New York, the Court ruled that

74. Id.
75. Id. at 21, 23-25.
76. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 521 (1926) (“[T]he very nature of our
constitutional system of dual sovereign governments is such as impliedly to prohibit the federal
government from taxing the instrumentalities of a state government . . . .”).
77. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
78. Id. at 586-87; see also Metcalf & Eddy, 269 U.S. at 523.
79. Metcalf & Eddy, 269 U.S. at 521.
80. 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) (prohibiting the State of Maryland from taxing a branch of
the Bank of the United States); see also Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 127 (1870)
(recognizing that states should enjoy the same immunity from federal taxation that federal
government enjoys from state taxation), overruled on other grounds by Graves v. New York ex
rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
81. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 12, 21.
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intergovernmental tax immunity did not apply because the tax was imposed
on the state acting in proprietary capacity, like any other merchant selling
spring water.82 Although perhaps not resting entirely on the proprietary
versus non-proprietary distinction, New York makes clear, at the very least,
that the federal government may not tax a state as a state.83
Here, the States argued the clawback does nothing more than impose a
direct tax on states as states, thus it violates the intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine.84 Under the proprietary function distinction, it could
hardly be suggested that states were operating as business entities in
administering Medicaid programs and thus properly subject to federal
taxation.85 Public benefits programs are core state functions, not proprietary
operations. More particularly, the clawback interferes with states’ ability to
govern and leaves them no choice but to allocate a portion of their budgets
to a federal program.86 Budget setting is a core state function that requires
states to allocate necessarily scarce resources among a variety of programs
and residents’ needs.87 The clawback interferes with state sovereignty by
removing a substantial portion of the budget from states’ control and
annually exposing them to an unpredictable federal tax, the amount of
which could change without notice or opportunity for objection or review.
The States noted that, as of their Supreme Court Petition filing date, the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had already “sent up to
three different notices to the States, repeatedly altering the clawback
amounts the States must pay in 2006.”88
The States argued that with the automatic offset penalty the clawback
operates as a mandatory, unconditional tax, not a conditional offer of
federal funds for Medicaid, thereby distinguishing this case from South
Dakota v. Dole,89 which upheld a federal statute that conditioned receipt of
82. 326 U.S. at 581; see also Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (upholding
federal license tax on sale of liquor where state had monopoly on sale of liquor), abrogated
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Helvering v. Powers,
293 U.S. 214 (1934) (upholding federal income tax as applied to employees of state-owned
railway), abrogated by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
83. 326 U.S. at 582.
84. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 5, 21.
85. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1256 (8th ed. 2004) (defining proprietary function to be
“[a] municipality’s conduct that is performed for the profit or benefit of the municipality, rather
than for the benefit of the general public”). See generally New York, 326 U.S. at 572
(discussing the federal government’s ability to tax a state depending what capacity it is acting
in).
86. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 136-38.
87. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 21.
88. Id. at 12 n.6.
89. 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987).
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federal highway funds on states enacting a specified minimum drinking age.
According to the States, the clawback does not require states to enact any
laws or implement a particular regulatory regime.90 The States argued that
nothing in the language of the clawback is conditional or optional. Instead,
the statute merely demands that states pay a specified amount of funds to
the federal government.91 In order to extract the payment, the federal
government can automatically offset the amount due against states’ Federal
Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP).92 Accordingly the States’ Brief
characterized the clawback as a direct, unconstitutional tax on states, rather
than a condition on receipt of federal funds.93 The States urged the Court
to review the case to examine the present scope of the intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine, which has not been squarely addressed or clarified since
New York in 1946.
2. Anti-Commandeering
The States’ anti-commandeering argument suggested that the clawback
operates as the federal government’s attempt to commandeer state
regulatory powers to carry out a federal program.94 Specifically, state
appropriations powers and state budgetary mechanisms were enlisted to
fund a federal program.95 The States relied on two key cases that prohibit
the federal government from commandeering states. First, in New York v.
United States,96 federal legislation required states to regulate radioactive
waste according to the federal scheme or, if they refused, to “take title” to
producers’ low-level radioactive waste, including liability and disposal costs
imposed by federal law.97 The Court held that giving states a choice
between two unconstitutional choices was “no choice at all.”98 States were
effectively compelled to enforce the federal regulations or face liability under
them. The legislation was struck down as being in violation of the anticommandeering principle.99 Similarly, in Printz v. United States,100 the
federal Brady Handgun Act was held to commandeer state executive officials

90. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 14-16.
91. Id. at i, 2.
92. 42 U.S.C. §1396u-5(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004).
93. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 15 n.10 (arguing unconstitutional condition, in the
alternative, because provision failed to give unambiguous notice of condition, thereby
impairing states’ ability to knowingly accept or refuse conditions).
94. Id. at 18.
95. Id.
96. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
97. Id. at 174-75.
98. Id. at 176.
99. Id. at 176, 188.
100. 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
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to perform background checks on gun purchasers. States had no choice
about carrying out the federal law enforcement function, so the Court struck
that provision of the legislation.101
The rationale for the anti-commandeering doctrine is that compelling
state governments to enforce a federal regulatory scheme undermines
political accountability.102 The federal government takes credit for enacting
legislation, yet is shielded from constituents’ objections to the law’s
implementation or enforcement.103 In the context of Part D, such tension is
readily apparent.
The federal government took credit for radically
expanding Medicare benefits but placed a substantial funding responsibility
on states and insulated federal lawmakers from taxpayers’ complaints about
the program’s price tag, which already far exceeded the administration’s
estimates.
3. Guarantee Clause
The States’ third substantive argument came under the Guarantee
Clause. The Constitution guarantees to every state a republican form of
government.104 This guarantee is violated if states cannot exercise their
state powers and discretion. The Court has consistently and repeatedly
acknowledged the Guarantee Clause’s protection of state sovereignty and
separate governance.105 The States argued that the clawback violates the
Guarantee Clause by “hijacking the States’ budgetary processes.”106 The
clawback effectively subjects states’ budgets to the discretion of federal
authorities, namely HHS and CMS, by statutorily empowering them to
command a substantial and unpredictable portion of state budgets.

C. Professors’ Amicus Brief
To buttress the States’ constitutional arguments and encourage the
Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to review the clawback,
two amici filed supporting briefs. First, ten states that did not participate as
petitioners filed a supporting brief, essentially restating the arguments

101. Id. at 935.
102. Id. at 930.
103. Id.
104. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
105. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999) (recognizing state’s right “to order
the processes of its own governance”); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 761 (1982) (noting that “power to make decisions and to set policy” is central to
state sovereignty); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868) (noting that each state is
“endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence”).
106. States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 20.
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described above.107 Second, a group of health law professors and
practitioners filed the Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Health Law as
Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs.108 Working with attorneys from the
Texas Solicitor General’s office and Jackson Walker L.L.P. in Austin, Texas, I
drafted and circulated the Professors’ Brief.
The objective of the Professors’ Brief was not to reargue the substantive
and jurisdictional grounds in the States’ Brief. Instead, we aimed to suggest
prudential or policy rationales for striking down the clawback and exercising
original jurisdiction by providing the Court with a fuller description of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs’ design and operation. Our goal was to
show that the clawback threatens both Congress’s initial design for the
programs and beneficiaries’ access to essential healthcare. Accordingly, we
urged the Court to strike down the clawback by exercising original
jurisdiction and not wait for the issue to percolate up from the lower courts.
We asserted two main prudential arguments. First, we demonstrated
that the clawback arrangement for funding the cost of dually eligible
beneficiaries’ drugs disrupts the design, structure, and guarantee of both the
Medicare and Medicaid programs.109 Second, we identified particular flaws
in the formula for calculating the clawback amount to highlight the
unpredictable and potentially detrimental impact that the payment would
have on states’ budgets and Medicaid operation.110
1. Program Design and Operation
Medicare has always been a fully federal program with uniform eligibility
and benefits nationwide.111 By design, Medicare is distinctly not a welfare
program.112 Any citizen with the requisite work history or disabling condition
qualifies, without regard to income.113 With minor exceptions, implemented
by the MMA, all beneficiaries receive the same level of benefits at the same
price, even if they have other means or benefits at their disposal.114 Tied to
Social Security benefits, which operate as a federal pension, Medicare is
essentially a federal healthcare program for retired and disabled workers.115

107. See generally States’ Amicus Brief, supra note 69.
108. See generally Professors’ Brief, supra note 15.
109. Id. at 6-7.
110. Id. at 8-10.
111. Id. at 4; Rehab. Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1463 (4th Cir. 1994).
112. See Professors’ Brief, supra note 15, at 4 (pointing out that “[p]rogram eligibility is
based on age or disability, rather than financial need”).
113. Id.
114. But see Jost, supra note 49 (discussing MMA’s addition of upper-level means-testing
for Part B and Part D drug benefit subsidies for low-income beneficiaries).
115. See Kinney, supra note 41, at 856 (noting that Medicare was based on a “social
insurance model . . . financed through a separate wage tax, and bases eligibility on

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

94

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 1:79

Medicaid, by contrast, is a state welfare program for low-income
residents.116 Eligibility traditionally was tied to eligibility for the state welfare
programs (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and, later,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)).117
The federal
government established Medicaid but left states to implement and operate
the program according to their own designs. Medicaid is a traditional
“conditional funding” program—states that choose to participate in the
program must comply with broad federal requirements in order to receive
federal funding support.118
The clawback alters the fundamental design of both the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. Medicare is no longer a fully federal program because
a substantial portion of the Part D benefit is funded directly by state
budgets.119 Medicaid is no longer a voluntary, conditional funding
program. States must remit the clawback amount or suffer automatic loss of
otherwise due FMAP.120 Another way of viewing the clawback, not argued
in the States’ Petition, is that it operates as a new, burdensome condition on
Medicaid participation, of which states had no notice and no opportunity to
decline. Under both views, the clawback fundamentally alters Medicaid’s
cooperative state-federal design.
Medicaid was included in the same legislation that created Social
Security, the federal pension program, and Medicare.121 Unlike Medicare,
which is fully federal, Medicaid is a “cooperative endeavor in which the
Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to

beneficiary contributions during working years”); see also Robert F. Rich & William D. White,
Federalism and Health Care Policy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 861, 872 (1998) (“With the
enactment of Medicare in 1965, the federal government assumed responsibility for acute care
of the elderly.”).
116. See Kinney, supra note 41, at 856 (“Congress adopted the welfare model for the
Medicaid program’s basic design.”).
117. Id. at 864; see also Bowen Garrett & John Holahan, Health Insurance Coverage After
Welfare, 19 HEALTH AFF. 175, 175 (2000).
118. See Kinney, supra note 41, at 856 (noting that “Medicaid is jointly . . . financed by
state and federal general revenues, and bases eligibility on a means test.”); Rich & White,
supra note 115 (noting that Medicaid was enacted at the same time as Medicare, “as a
partnership with the states. The program provided resources for cost sharing to induce states
to participate,” with a “range of voluntary options” but “terms of participation were
determined in Washington.”); Rosenbaum, supra note 42, at 10 (“Medicaid followed the
tradition of federal grant-in-aid programs, enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending clause
powers, which condition the receipt of federal funds by states that elect to participate on
compliance with a series of structural and operational conditions of participation.”).
119. See Channick, supra note 18, at 245-46.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004).
121. See Rosenbaum, supra note 42, at 8-9.
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aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons.”122 Medicaid is a true
welfare program in that eligibility is based on financial need, rather than
age or disability.123 Financial contribution by both the states and the federal
government is the “cornerstone of Medicaid.”124 Medicaid participation is
voluntary, but once a state chooses to participate, it must administer its
program in a manner consistent with the Medicaid Act’s requirements.125
Participating states must submit plans to federal authorities for approval.126
Each state’s plan must meet statutory requirements, including covering
broad categories of mandatory services and serving “categorically needy”
and certain “medically needy” beneficiaries.127 States’ Medicaid plans may
also extend optional benefits to other categories of beneficiaries and
services.128 Prescription drugs are one such optional benefit.129
Within the broad federal requirements, states have considerable
discretion over coverage, eligibility, enrollment, and administration of their
own Medicaid programs.130 Each state receives federal matching dollars on
a percentage basis for all money its Medicaid program spends on both
required and optional services. The FMAP, which ranges from 50% to 83%,
is based on the state’s relative wealth, with the poorest states receiving the
highest matching percentage.131 The matching grants are intended to
create an incentive for states to spend generously on their state Medicaid
plans by offering federal support for each dollar spent.132 The FMAP applies
122. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980); see also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
U.S. 879, 883 (1988).
123. Individuals who are both poor and either disabled or elderly qualify for both Medicaid
and Medicare and, thus, are termed dual-eligibles. See Rehab. Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42
F.3d 1444, 1463-64 (4th Cir. 1994) (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(providing overview of both programs and dual-eligibles).
124. McRae, 448 U.S. at 308.
125. See 42 U.S.C § 1396a(b) (2000); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502
(1990); McRae, 448 U.S. at 301-02.
126. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2007); Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. at 502.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A).
128. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; 42 C.F.R. § 440 (2007).
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(12) (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.120(a) (listing prescribed
drugs), 440.225 (designating optional services).
130. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 883 (1988) (noting that, “[s]ubject to the
federal standards . . . , each participating State must develop its own program describing
conditions of eligibility and covered services”).
131. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b, 1396d(b) (defining “federal medical assistance
percentage” (FMAP)); 42 C.F.R. §§ 433.10 (rates of federal financial participation (FFP)),
434.70 (2007) (conditions for FFP).
132. See Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 479-82 (1938)
(introducing symposium on “cooperative federalism” and describing various programs under
which Congress provided grants to states to encourage them to expand their activity). But see
Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and Health Care Reform,
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equally to beneficiaries and services that federal legislation requires states to
cover as well as expanded categories of beneficiaries and optional benefits,
including prescription drug coverage.133
Because states may choose not to participate in conditional funding
programs, cases involving such programs are distinguishable from the
commandeering cases cited in the Petitioner States’ Brief. The Court has
held that the federal government may constitutionally exercise its spending
power to enact legislation that creates incentives for state regulatory
programs, i.e., place conditions on federal funds to support them, as long
as the encouragement does not end up commandeering.134
Medicaid fits the conditional funding model, as the Court has repeatedly
recognized.135 States are free to opt out of Medicaid and set up their own
state health or welfare plans or provide nothing at all, but they will not
receive federal funding. States that choose to participate but fail to comply
with federal requirements may be denied federal financial assistance or
disqualified from participation in the Medicaid program.136 The clawback
and automatic offset penalty alter this model significantly. States now face a
new, unexpected condition on Medicaid participation. If they fail to comply
with the mandatory clawback, they lose FMAP dollars otherwise due.137
Given the unpredictable budgetary impact of the clawback, especially in the
first year of the new Part D benefit, there may be states that simply cannot
afford the demand under current budgets. Perversely, the poorest states
stand to lose the most under the clawback offset because the federal
matching percentage is based on the states’ relative wealth.138 Since its
enactment, the Medicaid program has made great strides in improving

28 CONN. L. REV. 115, 120 (1995) (suggesting that dollar-for-dollar matching grants, instead
of block grants, give states an improper incentive to “create ‘luxury’ health insurance
programs”).
133. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID PROGRAM–GENERAL INFORMATION,
TECHNICAL SUMMARY, at http://cms.hhs.gov/medicaidGeninfo/03_TechnicalSummary.asp (last
visited Nov. 10, 2007).
134. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1987) (federal legislation that
conditioned highway funds on states’ implementation of a minimum drinking age of twentyone did not violate spending power, as states could freely opt out). Several states, notably,
Louisiana, for many years turned down the offer of highway funds and tolerated the potholes,
recognizing a better fiscal benefit in tourism income from younger drinkers.
135. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (characterizing Medicaid as a
cooperative endeavor by which federal government created incentive for states to provide
healthcare to poor residents by offering federal financial assistance).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2000).
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2004).
138. See 42 C.F.R. § 433.10(b) (2007).
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healthcare access for low-income and medically vulnerable individuals.139
Accordingly, the clawback and automatic offset penalty undermine the very
essence of the Medicaid program.
2. The Clawback Formula
The second line of argument in the Professors’ Brief highlighted flaws in
the clawback formula’s operation. The formula for calculating states’
clawback payment is specified in the MMA statute and detailed in HHS
implementing regulations.140 The formula itself is not constitutionally
objectionable or grounds for striking down the clawback. But we hoped to
support the States’ substantive arguments and enhance the Court’s
understanding of the budgetary impact, violation of state sovereignty, and
threat to beneficiaries’ healthcare by explaining the inherent flaws and
unfairness in the formula and its unusual legislative history.
The MMA requires states to make monthly payments to federal
authorities, calculated annually as the states’ historical spending on
prescription drugs in the base year (2003) multiplied by the number of dual
eligibles in the current year, multiplied by the “phased down state
contribution,” which begins at 90% in year 1 (2006) and phases down to
75% in year 2015 and thereafter.141 Thus, the formula has three
components: (1) State per capita expenditures for prescription drug
coverage for dual-eligibles; (2) the number of enrolled dual-eligibles; and
(3) phased-down percentage, as specified in the Act.142 We demonstrated
flaws with each element of the formula.
(a) Using 2003 as the Base Year
First, the historical spending and 2003 base year permanently insert
unfairness and anomalies into the formula. The figure is the amount that
the state spent, per capita, on dual eligibles’ Medicaid prescription drug
costs in 2003.143 The base-year amount is trended forward, based on an
inflation factor and other adjustments that the HHS Secretary exclusively
controls.144 The problem with the base year is that it may reflect a one-time
139. See Marc L. Berk & Claudia L. Schur, Access to Care: How Much Difference Does
Medicaid Make?, 17 HEALTH AFF. 169, 170, 176-78 (1998).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 423.908, 423.910 (2007).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5; see also Implementation of the New Medicare Drug Benefit:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 34 (2006) (testimony of Mark B.
McClellan, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) (explaining that the
clawback was intended “to account for a portion of the costs that states had previously paid
for Medicare beneficiaries who are also in Medicaid”).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 423.10.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(3)(A).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(3)(B).
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aberration in state Medicaid drug spending in year 2003. For example,
states may have temporarily expanded drug spending in that year or
subsequently implemented successful cost-containment strategies that would
never be captured in the clawback formula.145 In addition, states are
perpetually denied the fiscal benefit of recent reforms to improve Medicaid
efficiency or contain costs during the time that they bore full responsibility for
prescription drug coverage. Meanwhile, the federal government garners a
windfall to the extent that states reduced Medicaid spending after 2003 until
Part D was implemented.
Moreover, the base-year figure penalizes states that were historically
more generous. Prescription drug coverage is an optional service under
Medicaid that all states were providing when the MMA was enacted.146 As
an optional benefit, states had full discretion over the scope of coverage
provided. But now, states that historically provided more generous
coverage than other states perpetually will be required to pick up a larger
share of the federal tab for Medicare Part D, without regard to their relative
wealth, financial resources, Medicaid enrollment, or current Medicaid
spending. States that provided generously in 2003 but were forced to cut
benefits due to budgetary or other pressures will be on the hook
continuously for the higher spending amount. In other words, the clawback
translates states’ past generous spending on state Medicaid programs into
mandatory generous support for a federal program.
The inflation factor is also problematic because it is based not on statespecific drug costs reflected in states’ individualized Medicaid drug
formularies. Starting from each state’s 2003 base-year spending level, the
amount is trended forward, theoretically to reflect rising prescription drug
costs over time.147 Recall that prescription drug coverage is optional under
Medicaid; accordingly, states may vary widely in the variety and number of

145. Forty-six out of fifty states implemented some type of Medicaid pharmacy cost-savings
reforms during 2003; forty-four took action in 2004, but these efforts will not be reflected in
the amount states are required to pay to the federal government. APRIL GRADY & CHRISTINE
SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMPLICATIONS OF THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT FOR
STATE BUDGETS CRS-3 n.4 (2004) (citing VERNON SMITH ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., STATES RESPOND TO FISCAL PRESSURE: STATE MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH AND COST
CONTAINMENT IN FISCAL YEARS 2003 AND 2004, RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE SURVEY apps. B-E,
available at http://kff.org/medicaid/upload/States-Respond-to-Fiscal-Pressure-State-Medicaid
-Spending-Growth-and-Cost-Containment.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2007)).
146. Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 118.
147. See 42 U.S.C § 1396u-5(c)(2)(A)(ii); 42 C.F.R. § 423.902 (2007) (defining
“[a]pplicable growth factor,” based on “National Total Drug National Health Expenditure
projections” for 2004-2006).
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drugs they choose to cover.148 The clawback base year is trended forward
for inflation, however, based on nationwide per capita drug costs under all
formularies.149 Various factors (e.g., regional practice preferences and
marketing, drug plan formularies, relative bargaining strength and price
negotiations, cost-containment laws and incentives) could produce
differences in prescription drug costs increases across states and regions.150
The amounts that private insurers’ prescription drug coverage or patients’
out-of-pocket spending on prescription drugs differ from and exceed states’
Medicaid spending levels will be inserted into the clawback formula,
inflating the amount that states are required to pay to the federal program.
Beginning in 2007, the growth factor will be tied to Medicare Part D
spending.151 Like the 2003 base year, the nationwide inflation factor could
result in grossly inaccurate estimates of states’ actual drug spending.
(b) Dually Eligible Beneficiary Enrollment
We also pointed out that using the current-year dually eligible
beneficiary enrollment factor is problematic because states are largely at the
mercy of the federal government’s efforts to increase enrollment in the new
Part D program. Part D was designed to promote quality and contain costs
by relying on competitive market incentives, with private insurers offering
competing drug plans that beneficiaries could select among based on ease
of enrollment, premiums, deductibles, service, coverage, quality, and other
factors.152 The success of the competitive model depended on the federal
government’s ability to create a sufficiently large market demand for drug
plans so that multiple insurers would choose to enter the market.153
Requiring dual eligibles to enroll in Part D plans, instead of state Medicaid
drug plans, was one approach to increasing the customer base.154 In
addition, the availability of the new Medicare drug benefit and the federal
government’s promotion efforts were expected to create an incentive for
previously unenrolled but eligible Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in the

148. See supra notes 125-135 and accompanying text (describing Medicaid conditional
funding and optional services).
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(2)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 423.902, 423.910(b) (defining
elements of formula).
150. See GRADY & SCOTT, supra note 145, at CRS-3. But see Medicare Program;
Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70 Fed. Reg. 4194, 4422 (Jan. 28, 2005) (declining to
adopt state-specific inflation factors because that approach would be “imprecise and would
introduce new reporting requirements”).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(4).
152. See Channick, supra note 18, at 267-69.
153. Id. at 269-70.
154. See Cody, supra note 2.
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program.155 Many new enrollees might discover, in the sign-up process,
that they also qualified for state Medicaid benefits. The so-called woodwork
effect could dramatically increase dual-eligible enrollment, escalating states’
direct Medicaid costs and clawback liability over time.156
We certainly did not argue that encouraging unenrolled, eligible
beneficiaries to sign up for Medicare and Medicaid was an undesirable,
much less unconstitutional, feature of Part D implementation. But we did
want to point out that the new Part D’s attraction and federal efforts to
“shake the trees” could dramatically increase state Medicaid rolls and,
thereby, state funding pressures, with little room for states to contain the
costs of increased enrollment. States that cannot balance the clawback’s
added costs and dual-eligible rolls may be forced to discontinue or limit
certain optional eligibility categories or more rigorously screen enrollment
applications to maintain existing rolls. One way states could contain budget
pressures would be to restrict eligibility, for example, by raising the income
level or other substantive requirements, to the extent states have discretion
under the federal Medicaid statute.157 Another approach would be to
restrict coverage or benefits under state Medicaid plans, again, to the extent
the federal requirements allow.158
However, both approaches are problematic. First, restricting enrollment
and eliminating previously covered services threatens beneficiaries’
entitlement to Medicaid and potentially exposes states to Section 1983
litigation for violating beneficiaries’ due process or other constitutional
rights.159 Aside from potential constitutional challenges, a policy problem

155. Professors’ Brief, supra note 15, at 15.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 3, 9-10.
158. See Cody, supra note 2, at 29 (highlighting adverse incentives on states to decrease
enrollment and services as result of clawback, and noting that “[s]everal states . . . have
recently announced plans to reduce or eliminate Medicaid coverage for certain individuals,
including dual eligibles”); Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 136 (noting that “[s]tates will
also face tough choices in deciding how generous to be in supplementing Medicare’s limited
national coverage” and “fear that decisions to extend supplemental benefits will doom them to
having to subsidize coverage in perpetuity if the national government ever decides to expand
its own benefits”).
159. See Professors’ Brief, supra note 15, at 7-10 (noting that restricting eligibility or
limiting services could run awry of Medicaid enrollees’ entitlement to a certain level of medical
care to which they have become accustomed. Therefore, states that choose these cost
containment strategies risk constitutional challenges from program beneficiaries); Pediatric
Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2006);
Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 719 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs had a “federal
right to . . . prompt provision of assistance under . . . the Medicaid Act, and that this right is
enforceable under section 1983”); see also Barker, supra note 18, at 65-67 (discussing cases
asserting enforceable entitlement to Medicaid benefits); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 39, at
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exists with incentivizing states to decrease enrollment, coverage, or services.
This incentive directly opposes FMAP’s intended incentive for states to spend
generously on their Medicaid programs. As one court eloquently noted in
considering beneficiaries’ Section 1983 challenge, underlying the
statistics, acronyms of agencies and bureaucratic entities, Supreme Court
case names and quotes, official governmental reports, periodicity tables,
etc. . . . let there be no forgetting the real people to whom this dry and
bloodless language gives voice: anxious, working parents who are too poor
to obtain medications . . . for their children, AIDs patients unable to get
treatment, [and] elderly persons suffering from chronic conditions like
diabetes and heart disease . . . .160

But if states opt to extend Medicaid eligibility, the clawback works against
the expansion by adding costs, directly opposing the intention of openended federal matching dollars to encourage broader state spending.161
The second component of the formula, counting the number of dualeligible Medicare Part D enrollees during the month in question, also leaves
states at the mercy of federal authorities who have full control and discretion
over Medicare enrollment.162 Unlike with Medicaid, under which states
have broad discretion, states have no authority or control over the Medicare
enrollment or coverage. For example, if Congress statutorily expands
Medicare eligibility, or CMS or other federal authorities ease the Medicare
enrollment or application process, states could face corresponding increases
in dual-eligible Medicaid enrollment and, accordingly, their clawback
obligations.
Furthermore, “the new Part D benefit could have a ‘woodwork’ effect of
encouraging previously unenrolled [but eligible] individuals to sign-up for
Federal enrollment and
government health insurance” programs.163
screening procedures may identify individuals as dually eligible and assist
them with referral to and applying for appropriate state Medicaid programs.
Much of the touted savings that states anticipate with the federal
government assuming the prescription drug costs could largely be lost to
increased dual-eligible enrollment.164
7-8 (describing Medicaid’s “three entitlements” to states, providers, and beneficiaries). But
see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement, 22 HEALTH AFF.
145, 147-48 (2003) (characterizing Medicaid as a “weak entitlement”).
160. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 281 (D.D.C. 1996).
161. See S. REP. NO. 89-404 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1934, 1951.
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2004).
163. Professors’ Brief, supra note 15, at 15.
164. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 4954–MEDICARE MODERNIZATION
AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG ACT OF 2002, at 1, 13 (2002) (as ordered reported by the House
Committee on Ways and Means) (reducing CBO’s initial fifty eight billion dollar estimate of
savings to states for the period of 2003-2012, to approximately twelve billion dollars, after
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Congress and the courts have previously recognized that changing
federal Medicare eligibility could increase Medicaid rolls and place financial
pressures on the states.165 To ease the pressure and prevent states from
opting out of Medicaid, Congress gave states alternative implementation
options. For example, when Congress added the federal Supplemental
Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI) program, it also
declared that all SSI recipients were entitled to Medicaid.166 Accordingly,
the SSI amendment “threatened to swell the Medicaid rolls and place a
large and immediate fiscal burden on participating states.”167 Congress
worried that “states would withdraw from the cooperative Medicaid program
rather than expand their Medicaid coverage” proportional to the expanded
federal benefit.168 Therefore, Congress gave states an alternative, the “§
209(b) option,” to automatically enrolling new SSI recipients in their
Medicaid plans. Fifteen states opted to be “§ 209(b) states.”169 No
comparable safety valve or option exists in Part D to help states absorb the
“woodwork” effect and increased enrollment resulting from the Part D
Medicare expansion. Thus, the possibility of states withdrawing from the
Medicaid program under Part D pressures, thereby undermining an essential
element of the welfare safety net, remains a very real possibility.
(c) The Phased-Down Percentage
The clawback formula’s third element is the phased-down state
percentage, beginning at 90% state funding in 2006 and phasing down to
75% state funding in 2015 and thereafter.170 Again, it is important to
emphasize that the states’ percentage phases down but never out
completely. States perpetually will pay for three-quarters of the cost of a
federal benefit for dual eligibles’ prescription drugs. The legislative history
of the clawback reveals its true intention.

offsets accounting for increased spending on new dual-eligible enrollees and other factors);
GRADY & SCOTT, supra note 145, at CRS 4-5 (noting potential increase in total state
expenditures if Part D screening process identifies additional Medicaid-eligible individuals).
165. See, e.g., Winter v. Miller, 676 F.2d 276, 278 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that “raising
benefits and lowering eligibility criteria” for Medicaid could “place a large and immediate
fiscal burden on participating states”).
166. Id. at 277-78; Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 38 (1981).
167. Winter, 676 F.2d at 278 (describing changes).
168. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 38 (describing the program); see also Cohen v. Quern,
608 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (N.D. Ill. 1984). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (2000)
(describing states’ duty to provide medical assistance to SSI recipients).
169. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 39-40, 40 n.6; Winter, 676 F.2d at 278.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(5)(A) – (J) (Supp. IV 2004).
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The clawback was an eleventh-hour addition to the MMA, inserted in an
attempt to address Part D’s significant budget overrun.171 The clawback did
not appear in either the House or Senate bill. Neither bill required dual
eligibles to switch drug coverage from state Medicaid plans to the to new
Medicare benefit. The Senate bill, in fact, required dual eligibles to
continue receiving their prescription drug coverage through state Medicaid
plans.172 The House bill gave these beneficiaries the option to enroll in Part
D and remain enrolled in the Medicaid drug plan; Part D would be primary
and Medicaid would be “wrap around” coverage.173 Under the House
version, states would temporarily contribute to the federal benefit for dual
enrollees, but the payment obligation phased out over time.174
The Bush administration, touting the new, expanded Medicare program,
affixed a $400 billion price tag to the Part D benefit.175 It quickly became
clear that $400 billion was a gross underestimation.176 Attempting to
address the cost overrun, the Conference Committee added three offsets.
First, beneficiaries were required to pay monthly premiums for Part D
coverage.177 Second, the Committee factored in the federal savings from
the FMAP amount no longer due to states for drug costs.178 That is, the
federal government would no longer have to pay matching dollars to states
for dual eligibles’ Medicaid drug plans because those beneficiaries would
be enrolled in Part D. Third, the Committee added the clawback,
permanently requiring states to shoulder a portion of the federal budget for

171. See Channick, supra note 18, at 274 (discussing the clawback provision’s costs to the
states); Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 133-34 (describing the tumultuous legislative
history of the MMA, including an “unprecedented nearly three-hour vote count delay while
party leaders twisted arms,” and the clawback enactment).
172. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE FOR MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES: A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF S. 1 AND H.R. 1, AND THE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT 5 (2003), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/Prescription-Drug-Coveragefor-Medicare-Beneficiaries-A-Side-bySide-Comparison-of-S-1-and-H-R-1-and-teh-Conference
-Agreement-H-R-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Connolly & Allen, supra note 62; Channick, supra note 18, at 238.
176. See Channick, supra note 18, at 238 (suggesting that Senator Edward Kennedy (DMass.) “freely admitted that the $400 billion is merely a down payment on the cost of
providing a prescription drug benefit to Medicare beneficiaries”); Dodge, supra note 51
(noting that many healthcare analysts “questioned whether the $400 billion for prescription
drugs and free-market forces would be enough, predicting Congress would have to find other
ways to contain Medicare costs”).
177. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 172, at 3.
178. Id. at 5.
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Part D.179 The clawback represents the largest offset, fixed as a permanent,
primary funding source for the new Part D benefit.180
Despite statutory language about the states’ “phased-down
percentage,” suggesting that the federal government retains the primary
obligation for the benefit, the Conference Committee report reveals the
reality of the arrangement. The committee notes speak in terms of “phasedin” federal assumption of “administrative costs,” making clear that states
have the primary funding obligation.181 Meanwhile, the federal government
claims full credit for a generous and unprecedented expansion of
Medicare.182 Moreover, the federal government retains full administrative
control for the program at all times even though its responsibility for the socalled administrative costs starts at only 10% and increases to a 25%
maximum. With their hands tied, states are unable to exercise any
discretion over the Part D benefit, cost, or enrollment levels.183 They are
required, however, to submit monthly payments, calculated by a formula
wholly outside of their control, with no opportunity for review, challenge, or
appeal.
The House bill’s reference to administrative costs and federal phase-in
inaccurately implies that states retain primary fiscal and administrative
responsibility for the drug benefit.184 The federal government, in fact,
retains full control over the new Part D program, including the authority to
increase states’ clawback payments or demand additional state
contributions through statutory revision if Medicare Part D expenditures
179. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at 509 (2003) (Conf. Rep.).
180. See GRADY & SCOTT, supra note 145, at CRS-1–2.
181. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at 509. Even the initial House Report proposal would
have phased-out state contribution (or “phased-in” 100% federal assumption of costs, in the
proposal's terminology) by 2019, unlike the finally enacted version that requires states
permanently to pay 75%. See id. at 506, 509.
182. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 (Dec. 8, 2003), at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031208-3.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007)
(announcing the MMA and touting that it will “help to create a modern Medicare system,
allow for the biggest improvements in senior health care in nearly 40 years, and provide
seniors with prescription drug benefits and more choices in health care” and that, “[f]or the
first time in Medicare's history, a prescription drug benefit will be offered to all 40 million
seniors and disabled Americans”); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism
and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346-47 (1983) (describing previous conditional
funding statutes and noting that “[s]uch legislation is relatively easy for Congress to pass
because legislators can take credit for bold, new initiatives without having to face up to the
problem of finding tax money to cover the costs of those programs”).
183. For a discussion of accountability and federalism principles that are violated when
states are forced to bear the expense of federal programs, see New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
184. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at 506-07.
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continue to overrun expectations. The federal government claims full credit
for expanding government healthcare benefits, while state authorities neither
receive credit for funding nor retain control over the expansive program.

D. The Outcome of the Petition
Despite the States’ and Amici’s best efforts, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari on June 19, 2006, inviting the States to pursue their claims in
lower courts.185 This disposition was not entirely unexpected, given the
infrequency of the Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction. Perhaps the
Petitioner States would have fared better had they pursued the litigation in
district court and used the standard appellate process to request Supreme
Court review if necessary. At the time the Petition was filed, however, with
the first unpredictable, possibly staggering clawback payments coming due,
the extraordinary strategy seemed warranted.
Somewhat surprisingly and despite the Court’s invitation, no state has
brought clawback litigation in lower courts. At least initially, the clawback’s
budgetary impact on states turned out not to be as great as anticipated.186
Most states broke even, compared to their previous Medicaid drug costs,
and some came out ahead in the first year.187 Given various features of the
clawback formula and the federal government’s complete control over its
calculation and operation, there is no guarantee that states will avoid a
future adverse budgetary impact. But, for now, the Petitioner and Amici
States appear to have directed their litigation and regulatory resources
elsewhere.
More importantly, the Supreme Court’s denial of review and states’ lack
of follow-up in lower courts leaves the constitutionality of the clawback still
very much an open question. Funding a fully federal program with a
permanent excise against states is an unprecedented and troubling
innovation in the federalist system. It runs awry of traditional notions of the
constitutional allocation of power between the federal and state
governments. With the recent attention on healthcare reform at both federal
and state levels, especially the attempt to identify strategies to defray the

185. Texas v. Leavitt, 126 S.Ct. 2915 (2006) (mem.).
186. VERNON SMITH ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., LOW MEDICAID SPENDING
GROWTH AMID REBOUNDING STATE REVENUES: RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET
SURVEY STATE FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007, at 48-49 (2006), available at
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7569-ES.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (compared to the
expense of covering drugs for dual eligibles through Medicaid, fifteen states reported their FY
2007 clawback obligation cost more, while fifteen states reported that it actually cost less.
Twenty states reported little to no change.)
187. Id.
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ever-increasing costs,188 this unique funding arrangement warrants closer
scrutiny.
Accordingly, this Article examines some of the constitutional objections
that the Court declined to consider, focusing particularly on the federalism
grounds. I conclude that the clawback should not survive a constitutional
challenge because it effectively commandeers state regulatory authority to
carry out a federal program. Alternatively, the clawback operates as a new,
retroactive condition on state’s voluntary Medicaid participation, exceeding
the federal government’s spending power to enact conditional funding
programs.
IV. FEDERALISM “TURF WAR”
The allocation of power and responsibility between the federal
government and the states is constitutionally grounded and was part of the
Framers’ design to facilitate centralized coordination at the federal level, on
the one hand, and diffusion of power and respect for state sovereignty, on
the other.189 Federal powers are enumerated in the Constitution, including
the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, the commerce power,
national security powers, and the catch-all Necessary and Proper Clause.190
Most health and welfare legislation at the federal level is enacted under the

188. See id. at 24. For example, Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell recently introduced
the “Prescription for Pennsylvania” plan. Among the various factors expected to reduce the
cost of healthcare, the proposal suggests incentivizing hospitals to reduce expensive
emergency department procedures for non-emergency health problems, and stopping
reimbursements to hospitals for unnecessary care in emergency departments. State Watch:

Pennsylvania Gov. Rendell Announces Proposal to Expand Health Care, Improve Quality,
Reduce Costs, KAISER DAILY HEALTH POLICY REPORT, Jan. 19, 2007, at www.kaisernetwork.org/
daily_reports/print_report.cfm?DR_ID=42367&dr_cat=3 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); see
also Governor’s Office of Health Care Reform, Prescription for Pennsylvania, at
www.ohcr.state.pa.us/prescription-for-pennsylvania/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
189. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (“It is incontestable that
the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’”); South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505, 533 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny
of small decisions—in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by
bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell”, quoting Laurence Tribe,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 381 (2d. ed. 1988)); see also Hills, supra note 5,
at 816 (“The national government has unique needs in maintaining the supremacy of federal
law and an orderly federal system, yet there must be a limit to federal power and a
corresponding reservoir of state power if federalism is to have any meaning at all.”); Rich &
White, supra note 115, at 862 (noting historical tension between national and state
governments and the “basic principle . . . of division of powers between distinct and coordinate governments”).
190. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the federal powers).
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spending or commerce powers.191 Spending power legislation must address
matters of national concern and be for the benefit of the general welfare.192
The Court has limited Congress’ ability to legislate social policy under the
Commerce Clause to the extent that social problems may not sufficiently
impact interstate commerce to justify use of that power.193 Spending power
challenges to federal welfare legislation, by contrast, have been consistently
rejected.194 Under the Supremacy Clause, if the federal government acts
within its constitutionally enumerated powers, its laws are supreme and
trump any contrary or inconsistent state laws.195
Under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, all governmental
powers not assigned to the federal government are reserved to the states.196
191. See Carleton B. Chapman & John M. Talmadge, Historical and Political Background
of Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 334, 336, 342 (1970).
192. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
193. See Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next Generation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1629,
1638-45 (2000). (suggesting that “the Court made clear that the relationship between a
regulated activity and interstate commerce must be substantial,” in his discussion of United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and federal Gun-Free School Zones Act); see also
Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Congressional Power Under
the Commerce Clause?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 225 (1996) (listing examples of federal
legislation enacted under Commerce Clause aimed at carjacking, arson, domestic violence,
child support, and research animals); Melanie L. Winskie, Note, Can Federalism Save the
Violence Against Women Act?, 31 GA. L. REV. 985, 1006-12 (1997) (citing cases and
analyzing VAWA under Commerce Clause).
194. See Levy, supra note 193, at 1656-57, 1656 n.119 (citing lower court cases and
discussing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
195. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation
& Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) (noting that the
states retained “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at
245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
156 (1992) (noting that the Constitution, “[b]eing an instrument of limited and enumerated
powers, it follows irresistibly, that what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state
authorities”) (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
3, at 752 (1833)); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 124 (1870) (overruled on other grounds)
(quoting Tenth Amendment on reserved powers and noting that “[t]he government of the
United States, therefore, can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution,
and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary
implication”); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s
Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 85 (“It is basic civics that the national government is
one of delegated powers. All powers not delegated are retained by the state governments.”).
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Some of the most important powers reserved to the states are the “police
powers” to protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens.197 Most state
healthcare programs, including Medicaid, fall clearly within states’ broad
police powers. Federal authority limits state police powers only if the state
action or law violates the U.S. Constitution or is preempted by federal
enumerated powers.198 In addition, the federal government cannot require
states to legislate according to Congress’s instructions.199 “[A]n essential
attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty [is] that they remain independent
and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.”200 The Framers’
express assignment of power to the federal government and reservation of
all other powers to the states preserved broad state sovereignty.201 The
challenge is defining the scope of the limited enumerated federal powers
and broad reserved powers, especially when the two governments are
attempting to regulate in the same area or coordinate regulatory
responses.202

A. Two Theoretical Views
In this discussion, I suggest two theoretical approaches to the federalism
turf war. First, federalism may be viewed as a structural limit on respective
federal and state powers that is hard-wired into the Constitution.
Alternatively, federalism may be viewed as a contractual limit on the
respective powers, allowing either side to freely agree to assign duties to or
assume additional duties from the other.
1. Structural Limit
If federalism operates as a structural limit on respective federal and state
powers, it would be impermissible for Congress to impose certain regulatory
burdens on states, even if states agreed to them.203 The Framers are

197. See Levy, supra note 193, at 1633 (noting that the “Tenth Amendment was
interpreted as reserving the ‘police power’ to the states and federal legislation that usurped
that power was invalid”).
198. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
199. New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
200. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
201. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 288, 292-93(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
202. New York, 505 U.S. at 155 (“[T]he task of ascertaining the constitutional line
between federal and state power has given rise to many of the Court’s most difficult and
celebrated cases.”).
203. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182 (“Where Congress exceeds its
authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be
ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”); Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 560 (1891)
(“It does not admit of argument that congress can neither delegate its own powers, nor
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assumed to have included structural limits in Constitution itself to avoid
concentration of power in the federal government or dilution of coordinated,
centralized power to the separate states.204 The structural view also may
reflect the notion that states lack institutional competence in certain areas
and, therefore, may not voluntarily assume those duties expressly
enumerated as federal powers.205 As the Supreme Court noted, “Where
Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, . . . the departure from
the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state
officials.”206
An analogy in administrative law is the non-delegation doctrine which
prohibits Congress from delegating certain functions and administrative
agencies from making independent choices about what powers to
assume.207 From a states’ rights perspective, the structural view undermines
state autonomy. States cannot agree to assume duties that are identified as

enlarge those of a state.”); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1883) (federal
government’s “sovereign attributes” cannot “be transferred to a state”).
204. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985)
(noting that the “composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect
the States from overreaching by Congress” and that “[s]tate sovereign interests, then, are more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system
than by judicially created limitations on federal power”); see also McAllister, supra note 193,
at 240-41 (describing values of federalism); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 89
(“Federalism has allowed for national control over problems truly national in scope, while
preserving participatory democracy at the local level of governance.”). See generally Malcolm
Wallop, The Centralization of Power and Governmental Unaccountability, 4 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 487 (1995) (bemoaning recent shift of power away from self-government toward
central government).
205. See Hills, supra note 5, at 832-35 (providing support for view that Framers harbored
“a deep distrust and disapproval of state officials”); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic
Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 900 (1999) (suggesting
that “American federalism was a pragmatic invention, a compromise designed to leave the
states with primary responsibility for governing while granting the national government
sufficient power to handle those aspects of government beyond the states’ institutional
competence”).
206. New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
207. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 182 (citing Chadha and
Buckley in discussion regarding structural limits on separation of powers into three branches of
government); Hills, supra note 5, at 831-32 (suggesting non-delegation doctrine as analogy
to nationalistic theory of state sovereignty); id. at 840-43 (describing Justice Story’s dissent in
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), and opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), as suggesting a “nationalistic nondelegation theory” of state
autonomy).
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federal powers because it would exceed their competence and violate the
Constitution.208
2. Contractual Limit
Under the alternative view of federalism as a contractual limit on power,
the federal government can delegate even enumerated powers to states,
and states can freely agree to a federal regulatory scheme or assume a
burden.209 The delegation is limited only to the extent that states must be
given clear notice of the terms and conditions so they can knowingly and
voluntarily agree.210 Accordingly, the federal government will have to offer
adequate incentives, typically money, to elicit the states’ agreement.211
Consistent with the structural view, simple commandeering is still
impermissible under the contractual view because it denies states the ability
to opt in or out of assuming federal powers.212 One commentator
described this view of federalism as assigning a “New York entitlement” to
states, meaning that states hold the right to refuse participation in the
federal program but can freely bargain away that entitlement if, given the
terms and conditions of the offer, doing so is in their or their constituents’
interests.213 This view is similar to Coasian land use rules: no matter which

208. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 615-16 (1842) (concluding that federal
government could not force state to enforce Fugitive Slave Clause, even if it wanted to do so
because clause was found in federal Constitution); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935 (1997) (holding that federal government cannot unconditionally force states to
implement federal regulatory program).
209. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
210. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (superseded
by statute) (statute must provide a clear expression of Congress's “intent to condition
participation in the program[ ] . . . on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity”);
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of
the ‘contract’”); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 71-72 (1994) (noting
that “Pennhurst’s contractual characterization of spending conditions has been repeatedly
reaffirmed” and citing cases); Levy, supra note 193, at 1654-55 (describing Court’s “clear
statement” limit on spending power, “requiring conditions on federal monies to be explicitly
stated in the pertinent statutes”).
211. See Hills, supra note 5, at 860-61 (describing system of conditional grants and oneon-one bargaining between state and federal government over whether to accept conditions
and apply for funds).
212. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (“[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power
is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions.”).
213. See Hills, supra note 5, at 822-23 (describing rule); see also Edward A. Zelinsky,
Accountability and Mandates: Redefining the Problem of Federal Spending Conditions, 4
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 482 (1995) (“Is it meaningful to conceive of the states as
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party holds the initial property right, parties will, in the absence of
transaction costs, negotiate for the most efficient allocation of resources.214
The contractual view of federalism enhances state autonomy by allowing
states to accept responsibilities, and the attached funds, even if structural
limits would seem to prevent such delegation of power.

B.

Conditional Spending Power

The federal government may constitutionally legislate for the general
welfare under its spending power, as long as the legislation addresses a
matter of public concern.215 Public benefits programs, such as Social
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance
Program, are spending power enactments that have withstood constitutional
challenges.216 The federal government may also exercise its spending
power to encourage states to adopt various laws and programs by offering
financial inducements.217 The federal government can offer funds with
strings attached, thereby effecting state-level legislation, even though
Congress could not mandate that states enact those laws without violating
federalism principles.218

bargaining with the federal government? Can the states protect themselves politically in
Congress?”).
214. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (1960), reprinted in THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
AND THE LAW 95, 102-04 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1988); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8, 55-58 (5th ed. 1998) (applying the Coase theorem, defined
simply as the notion that “if transactions are costless, the initial assignment of a property right
will not affect the ultimate use of the property,” to address the problem of incompatible land
uses); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106 (1972) (“Why cannot
a society simply decide on the basis of the already mentioned criteria who should receive any
given entitlement, and then let its transfer occur only through a voluntary negotiation?”);
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 32-38 (1993) (describing the effect of the
initial position, or baseline, of rights and bargaining difficulties to discuss the problem of
“unconstitutional conditions” and the power of the state over individuals).
215. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Comm’r v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,
640 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
216. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 725-26 (2006)
(cataloging federal programs and citing cases involving spending power legislation); A.
Raymond Randolph, Panel Two: Limits on National Power and Unconstitutional Conditions, 4
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 458 (1995) (examining limits of the federal conditional
spending power).
217. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206-07 (citing cases that exemplify use of the conditional
spending power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (same).
218. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (noting that “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s
‘enumerated legislative fields’ . . . may nevertheless be attained through the use of the
spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds”) (citing United States v. Butler,
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The leading case upholding the federal government’s conditional
spending power is South Dakota v. Dole.219 The challenged federal law
conditioned states’ receipt of federal highway funds on states establishing a
minimum drinking age of twenty-one years.220 Because states could freely
opt out and maintain laws allowing alcohol sales to younger people, thus
retaining their state sovereignty, the Court upheld the federal law.221 A pair
of earlier cases, Commissioner v. Davis222 and Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis,223 authorized use of the federal spending power to achieve regulatory
ends and held that applying a federal tax on employers to support the
federal Social Security Act and unemployment compensation funds did not
violate the Tenth Amendment or impinge unjustifiably on state
sovereignty.224
Those and subsequent cases outline the limits of the conditional
spending power. First, the exercise of spending power must be in the pursuit
of “the general welfare.”225 Second, the conditions must be stated
unambiguously, allowing states to exercise their choice “knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”226 Third, conditional
spending power projects must be related “to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs.”227 Finally, the conditional grant of funds
must not violate other constitutional provisions—the so-called independent

297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981) (“[O]ur cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall
disburse federal money to the States.”).
219. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
220. Id. at 205.
221. Id. at 211-12 (characterizing condition on funds as “mild encouragement” and
suggesting that “enactment of [minimum drinking age] remains the prerogative of the States
not merely in theory but in fact”).
222. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
223. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
224. Davis, 301 U.S. at 645-46 (regarding Social Security Act); Steward Mach. Co., 301
U.S. at 592-93 (regarding unemployment compensation law). The cases, decided on the
same day, overruled United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), where the Court struck down
provisions of Agricultural Adjustment Act as invading states’ reserved rights. See generally
Robert M. Cover, Federalism and Administrative Structure, 92 YALE L.J. 1342, 1342-43
(1983) (describing cases); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the

Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 461-69 (2003) (describing Dole and cases in its
aftermath).
225. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Davis, 301 U.S. at 640-41).
226. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
227. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)).
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constitutional bar.228 There may also be a germaneness limit that requires
the conditions to bear some relationship to the overall purpose of the
legislation.229
Dole makes clear a limit on the conditional spending power that is
particularly relevant to analyzing the constitutionality of the clawback:
conditions or inducements may be offered to states, but compulsion or
coercion is unlawful.230 The financial inducement offered by Congress
might be “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into
compulsion.’”231 The Dole Court rejected South Dakota’s inference of
coercion from the fact that the program was very successful, i.e., most states
agreed to the condition on receipt of highway funds.232 The fact that most
states go along with an offer does not prove that it is coercive; it may be
simply that the federal government’s offer is sufficiently attractive to most
states.233 In addition, requiring states to give up a small percentage of
federal highway funds if they refuse to abide the minimum drinking age
does not prove coercion.234 Likewise, it could be argued that the potential
loss of a small percentage of Medicaid funds if states refuse to pay the
clawback might not cross the line from pressure into compulsion.

C. The Clawback and Conditional Spending Power
As pointed out in the previous Section, the argument can be made that
the clawback’s effect of withholding a small percentage of federal funds
from a state that refuses to comply with its mandate is not compulsion. But
there are also potential arguments against the constitutionality of the
clawback under Dole and the conditional spending cases. In early drafts of

228. Id. at 208, 210 (discussing limitation); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch.
Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976).
229. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09, 208 n.3 (finding limit met on the facts of the case,
although not holding it is required in all cases); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
167 (1992) (noting that conditions must “bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal
spending”). See generally Huberfeld, supra note 45, at 489 n.255 (observing that the
“germaneness limit” was “key to Justice O’Connor’s dissent” in Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-14);
McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 120-21 (noting that Justice Rehnquist’s footnote
suggests that congressional spending power may be limited by “a requirement that any
condition attached to a federal grant bear some relationship to that grant” and that Justice
O’Connor appeared to rely on that limit in her dissent (citations omitted)).
230. But see Baker & Berman, supra note 224, at 467-68 (suggesting that Dole’s
“coercion” test has failed to operate as a meaningful limit on federal spending power and that
“lower courts have consistently failed to find impermissible coercion”).
231. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
232. Id.
233. Id. (“We cannot conclude . . . that a conditional grant of federal money of this sort is
unconstitutional simply by reason of its success in achieving the congressional objective.”).
234. Id.
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the Professors’ Brief, I argued that the clawback failed the Dole limits by
operating as an ambiguous condition on states’ receipt of federal Medicaid
funds because the states were not notified of its consequences. The
Medicare Part D clawback, and the statutory authority to offset unpaid
clawback amounts against states’ FMAP, disrupts the fundamental
“cooperative federalism” Medicaid funding arrangement.235 The clawback
penalty offset exposes states to the costs of unilaterally funding their
Medicaid programs without federal contribution for the first time since
Medicaid’s enactment. Thus the clawback violates the “contract” that states
accepted when they first established their state Medicaid programs and were
promised federal matching grants. As the Court has clearly stated,
Congress “did not intend a participating State to assume a unilateral
funding obligation for any health service in an approved Medicaid plan.”236
Up to the amount of the penalty, states’ Medicaid spending will be
unmatched by federal dollars, contrary to the statutory requirements,
congressional intent, and recognized judicial limits.
My argument, however, was incompatible with the States’
intergovernmental tax immunity argument that the clawback operated as a
mandatory tax on states qua states. It would be inconsistent to suggest, on
the one hand, that the clawback was an unconstitutional condition on grant
of federal funds, and, on the other hand, that it was an unconditional
federal tax on state governments.237 For reasons discussed in more detail
below, I continue to find merit in the Dole arguments against the clawback
and encourage future litigants to consider them as a potentially fruitful line
of objection to the funding mechanism’s continued operation.
1. The clawback exceeds congressional spending power.
The Medicaid program is a federal spending power program that
extends federal dollars to states on the condition that they establish state
Medicaid plans in compliance with certain federal requirements and
mandates.238 Conditions on Medicaid funding include providing certain
mandatory services to certain categories of beneficiaries.239 The Medicaid
program has never required states to fund most of the costs of a separate

235. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 138 (noting that “[s]ince the founding of the
Republic, the federal and state governments have worked interactively to expand health care
coverage to increasingly larger swaths of the poor and near-poor population” and that “MMA
represents a major change in federal-state relations”).
236. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309 (1980) (emphasis added).
237. See States’ Brief, supra note 1, at 15 n.10.
238. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002) (recognizing Medicaid as
spending power legislation); see also Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156-57 (1986).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2000).
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federal program as a condition of federal matching dollars. To the
contrary, the Medicaid statute promises open-ended federal funding to
match states’ spending on a dollar-for-dollar percentage basis, without
caps, as long as the state spending is for an approved Medicaid program
that complies with federal requirements.240
The Part D clawback and corresponding automatic penalty for
nonpayment, an offset against otherwise due federal Medicaid matching
dollars, operate together as a new, unconstitutional condition on states’
Medicaid participation. The Part D statute expressly provides: “As a
condition of its State plan under [Medicaid] and receipt of any Federal
financial assistance under [Medicaid],” states must comply with certain
The
requirements, including the clawback and offset provisions.241
clawback is unconstitutional because it does not provide adequate,
unambiguous notice of the condition, allowing states freely to exercise the
choice to decline federal funding.
2. The clawback fails to provide clear notice of the consequences of
Medicaid participation.
The clawback fails the second Dole limit, which requires the conditions
on federal grants to be unambiguous, allowing states to exercise their
choices knowingly, aware of the consequences of participation.242 States
were entirely blindsided by the new condition on Medicaid participation.
The Part D statutory provision that allows federal authorities to collect the
unpaid clawback amount, plus interest, through an automatic and
immediate offset of Medicaid funding otherwise due, deprives states of the
opportunity to opt into Medicaid, fully aware of the consequences of
participation.243
The clawback is a new condition on federal dollars, enacted long after
all states already had agreed to participate in the Medicaid program and
comply with the broad federal requirements. The federal government
cannot constitutionally impose a substantial, ex post facto condition on
Medicaid funding.244 The only way for states to exercise their sovereign
240. See NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, THE BASICS: MEDICAID FINANCING 1 (Sept. 13, 2006),
available at www.nhpf.org/pdfs_basics/Basics_MedicaidFinancing_09-13-06.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2007).
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(a), (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C) (2000) (emphasis added). Likewise,
the legislative history of the clawback expressly provides: “The provision establishes certain
requirements, as a condition of receiving federal Medicaid assistance,” to share certain costs
of the new Part D benefit. H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at 509 (2003) (Conf. Rep.).
242. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). See generally Huberfeld, supra note 45.
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(C).
244. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1988).
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discretion, from now on, is to opt out of the Medicaid program entirely.245
States could not possibly have been cognizant that Medicaid participation
required them to fund a separate, expanded federal Medicare benefit.
Therefore, the condition fails the Dole test.
3. The clawback passes the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion.

Dole also provides that federal spending power is exceeded if the
financial inducement that Congress offers leaves states effectively no choice
but to participate. Conditions on federal grants may be unconstitutional if
they are so “coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into
compulsion.’”246 Nevertheless, Congress may “encourage” activity through
the spending power that it could not compel pursuant to other powers. In
Dole, the court held that conditioning federal highway funds on states
enacting a minimum drinking age operated as “relatively mild
encouragement to the States.”247
A condition becomes unduly coercive if it leaves states with no option to
avoid the federal demand.
Moreover, a choice between two
unconstitutional conditions is no choice at all. In New York v. United States,
the State of New York challenged certain federal environmental laws
involving radioactive waste disposal. The federal law required states to take
responsibility for low-level radioactive waste generated within their
borders.248 The law offered various incentives to encourage states to
comply with their statutory obligation. Together, the incentives effectively left
states with the choice to either implement the federal regulatory scheme or
take title to radioactive waste and pay all fines and damages as if the state
itself generated or owned the waste.249 Likewise, here, states face two
options that effectively leave them no choice. On the one hand, states can
pay the demanded clawback, or, on the other hand, they can assume full
financial responsibility for their Medicaid programs. The first option is not a
choice but merely a mandate. The second option directly contradicts the
Court’s clear recognition that Congress did not intend for states to bear the
burden of unilaterally funding Medicaid services:

245. See Huberfeld, supra note 45, at 482 (noting that “[i]f states do not pay the federal
government the ‘clawback’ amount, they stand to lose all of their federal Medicaid funding”).
246. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
247. Id.
248. 505 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1992).
249. Id. at 175-76. (“A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory
techniques is no choice at all.”)
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The Medicaid program is one of federal and state cooperation in funding
medical assistance; a complete withdrawal of the federal prop in the system
with the intent to drop the total cost of providing the service upon the states,
runs directly counter to the basic structure of the program and could
seriously cripple a state’s attempts to provide other necessary medical
services embraced by its plan.250

In sum, the Part D clawback and automatic offset penalty operate as a
condition on Medicaid matching dollars that states have no choice but to
accept. Accordingly, the clawback turns strong pressure into compulsion by
leaving states no choice but to pay the demanded amount to support the
federal prescription drug benefit. The only way to avoid the clawback is to
opt out of the federal program. States choosing not to pay the clawback
could continue to provide healthcare benefits to their residents, free of any
requirements under the federal Medicaid statute, but with no federal
financial support.
All states have established and administered state Medicaid programs
over many years. Those choosing not to accept the clawback condition
would be forced to dismantle a broad, essential medical insurance program
for the states’ poorest residents and expose themselves to statutory
entitlement, constitutional due process, and other legal challenges from
patients and providers suddenly left out in the cold.251 Alternatively, states
could assume the entire cost of maintaining their existing Medicaid
programs. But continuing to fund a fully state program that previously
received substantial federal financial assistance is a solution that hamstrings
state budgetary and administrative discretion.
4. The clawback is an unconstitutional, retroactive condition.
Even when viewed as a condition on Medicaid participation, the
clawback is a new, potentially onerous condition about which states had no
notice at the time they agreed to accept federal Medicaid grants.252
Accordingly, states could not have possibly knowingly and voluntarily agreed
to this condition, fully cognizant of its consequences. State Medicaid
funding can be pulled for noncompliance through the automatic offset of
amounts otherwise due.253 Thus, the clawback also effectively denies States
a promised portion of FMAP.

250. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309 n.12 (1980) (citing Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis,
591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1979)).
251. See, e.g., Barbara R. Grumet, Who is “Due” Process?, 42 PUB. ADM. REV. 321, 323
(1982) (describing the property interest created by Medicare’s and Medicaid’s entitlement
nature).
252. See supra Part III.B.
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-5(c)(1)(A), (C).
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The clawback effectively imposed a new, retroactive condition on
Medicaid participation that is contrary to the Dole “unambiguous condition”
or “clear statement” limit.254 In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman,255 the State of Pennsylvania faced a challenge from a state
resident and recipient of residential services for the mentally retarded who
claimed that the state failed to provide “appropriate treatment” in the “least
restrictive” environment, as required by the federal Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.256 Under this congressional
spending power Act, states could receive federal financial assistance for
creating programs to care for and treat persons with developmental
disabilities.257
The Court rejected the resident’s claim, however, on the grounds that
“findings” in the Act did not operate as conditions on federal funding but,
rather, as general statements of federal policy.258 A federal statute can
impose conditions on granting funds to states only if Congress
unambiguously expressed intent to do so,259 which it did not do here. This
rule operates on the premise that Congress knows how to explicitly state
conditions on funding, so statements may be deemed merely precatory if

254. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending
Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1188-89, 1198-201 (2001) (describing Pennhurst doctrine and
requirement that conditions be “unambiguously expressed”). Constitutional principles of
fairness and due process generally oppose retroactive laws. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-10, 213-15 (1988) (disallowing HCFA’s retroactive promulgation
of wage index rules to adjust hospital reimbursement); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 263-64 (1994) (recognizing a presumption against retroactivity; firmly rooted
in jurisprudence; fairness).
255. 451 U.S. at 1.
256. Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486, 502 (1975) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §
6010 but omitted by amendment in 1984). This provision contained congressional findings
respecting rights of the developmentally disabled similar to those found in 42 U.S.C. § 6009
(2000).
257. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 11.
258. Id. at 19 (reading section 6010 in the context of “other, more specific provisions of
the Act, does no more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment.
It is simply a general statement of ‘findings’ and, as such, is too thin a reed to support the
rights and obligations read into it by the court below”); see also Note, Making the Old
Federalism Work: Section 1983 and the Rights of Grant-in-Aid Beneficiaries, 92 YALE L.J.
1001, 1006-07 (1983) (describing Court’s holding that Act was “a ‘mere federal-state
funding statute,’ intended to encourage but not to coerce, the states to develop certain
programs” (citations omitted)).
259. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. See generally 42 U.S.C 1396u-5 (2000).
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they do not make conditions explicit.260 The Court concluded that the Act’s
provisions did not create enforceable rights.261 The language fell well short
of providing clear notice to states that they would have to comply with them
to receive federal funds.262 Pennhurst also recognized that Congress cannot
require states to comply with new, retroactive conditions, after they have
already accepted federal funds.263
The unambiguous condition or clear statement rule comports with the
contract view of federalism. The legitimacy of an offer turns on whether a
state “voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”264
There can be no knowing acceptance if states are unaware or unable to
ascertain what is expected of them.265 But if states do receive clear,
unambiguous notice of the terms of the contract, this view seems to say they
could freely acquiesce to even onerous conditions.266 To deny states the
possibility of that choice, on structural federalism grounds, would violate
state autonomy. If the conditions are clear and sufficiently attractive to
states, they should have the option to accept them.267
The clawback violates both the clear statement rule and the retroactivity
principle. States cannot knowingly and voluntarily agree to a condition of
which they were unaware at the time they accepted federal Medicaid funds.
There was no clear—nor, indeed, any—notice of the clawback condition at
the time that the states accepted federal funds. Therefore, states could not
choose to opt out of Medicaid to avoid the consequences of the condition.
Futhermore, the clawback operates retroactively because it was imposed
after states agreed to accept Medicaid funds. Even if states could be
deemed aware in year 2007 and forward, the condition would be coercive

260. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18; see Smith, supra note 254, at 1199 (noting Court’s
conclusion that “findings” in section 6010 did not create rights but “were mere precatory
statements by Congress”).
261. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 25 (“Though Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it
does not include surprising participating States with post acceptance or ‘retroactive’
conditions.”).
264. Id. at 17; see also Huberfeld, supra note 45, at 448 (describing Pennhurst and noting
that “[i]n analyzing the ability of Congress to place conditions on the use of federal funds, the
Court emphasized a now-familiar analogy that Spending Clause legislation is ‘in the nature of
a contract.’”); Engdahl, supra note 210, at 70-72 (discussing Pennhurst as contractual limit
on federal spending power).
265. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
266. See id.
267. See Hills, supra note 5, at 822-23; Engdahl, supra note 210, at 71 ( “What makes
such conditions obligatory is that essence as contract, wholly apart from the circumstance that
they happen to be spelled out as a statute or an agency rule. Although articulated in a statute
or rule, they have no force as ‘law’; their only force is contractual.”)
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at that point because states would have no choice but to comply or
restructure and fully fund state welfare programs.268
Conditions on federal grants that operate retroactively or fail to give
states clear notice of the consequences of participation violate the contract
view of federalism.269 States cannot freely and voluntarily agree to enter a
contract with the federal government to assume federal regulatory functions
if they do not know the contractual terms.270 In traditional contract law,
courts may declare a contract void if the terms are hidden or ambiguous.271
In addition, one party would not be permitted to enforce a new, substantive
provision of the contract against the other party without that party’s
agreement to be bound by the new term.272 States did not receive clear
notice of the clawback as a condition of FMAP and were not given an
opportunity to decide whether to accept the new condition before the
federal government demanded payment.273 Thus, the clawback is an
unconstitutional exercise of federal spending power.

D. Commandeering
The States raised a different federalism argument than the argument that
I advanced above that the clawback exceeds the Dole limits on conditional
spending power. In their intergovernmental tax immunity argument, the
States urged that the clawback was not a condition on federal Medicaid
money but a mandatory tax.274 Accordingly, they could not then argue that
the clawback was an ambiguous or otherwise unconstitutional condition.
Instead, the States argued that the clawback “commandeered” state
legislative and budgetary processes, requiring them to allocate an
undeterminable portion of state budgets to fund the federal prescription
drug benefit.275 The Court had previously recognized that Congress could
268. See supra notes 246-251 and accompanying text (describing “pressure turns to
compulsion” arguments).
269. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25.
270. See id. at 17.
271. See, e.g., Local Motion, Inc. v. Niescher, 105 F.3d 1278, 1280 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“The presence of an ambiguous material term may indicate that no meeting of the minds
occurred when the document was signed.”); 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
4.10 (rev. ed. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981) (regarding effect of
misunderstanding).
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (1981) (regarding acceptance of offer).
273. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 137 (discussing states’ loss of Medicaid
federal matching funds as result of MMA).
274. See supra Part II.B.1.
275. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing States’ argument). For similar successful arguments,
see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (regarding unconstitutional obligations
placed on local officers under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (regarding unconstitutionality of toxic waste take-title).
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not commandeer state legislatures to implement a federal regulatory
scheme for low-level radioactive waste276 or enlist state law enforcement
officers to execute federal handgun control law by performing background
checks on prospective handgun purchasers.277 In both cases, the Court
recognized that Congress cannot “conscript” state governments or officers
to carry out federal legislation.278
In a sense, New York, Printz, and the commandeering line of cases,
represent not so much a new limit on federal spending power, but another
way to think about the ultimate limit in Dole. That is, when does pressure
turn to compulsion and thus commandeering? In some cases, Congress
may attempt to directly conscript state legislative or executive functions to
carry out a federal regulatory scheme. In other cases, Congress may
ostensibly hold out a federal funding “carrot” to encourage state
participation in a federal program. But when the carrot is one that states
simply cannot afford to refuse, the offer turns from a conditional grant into
commandeering. As one commentary summarized, “The basis of the
Court’s holding [in Dole] is that there is a difference between coercing
compliance (an exercise of regulatory power) and buying compliance (an
exercise of the spending power).”279 When a condition leaves states not
merely with a hard choice, but with no choice at all about whether to accept
federal funds, the program becomes commandeering.280
The commandeering cases involve congressional attempts to enlarge
federal power and encroach on the states’ reserved powers. Under this
structural view of federal-state relations, commandeering is unconstitutional
because Congress cannot interfere with states’ autonomy, and states
“cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond
those enumerated in the Constitution,”281 even if attractive incentives for
doing so exist. Structural limits prohibit states from assuming certain federal
276. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
277. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
278. New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (“Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause
Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its
agents.”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly.”); see Evan Caminker,
The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1075
(1997) (suggesting that the “Supreme Court has held that principles of state sovereignty
preclude Congress from ‘commandee[ring] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a regulatory program’”) (quoting New York, 505 U.S.
at 161); Sarnoff, supra note 5, at 207 (noting that New York clarified that Congress may not
direct state legislatures to implement federal programs).
279. See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 101.
280. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
281. New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
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powers, even voluntarily.282 The rationale for enforcing structural limits on
states assuming federal powers is grounded in political accountability, a sort
of federalism “hot potato” for controversial reforms.283 Without structural
limits, the federal government could enact sweeping reforms and require
states to implement them, thereby avoiding accountability for
implementation decisions, such as where to locate a radioactive waste
disposal site or restricting handgun availability. States, on the other hand,
might disavow responsibility for the disposal site’s location or the difficulty of
obtaining firearms by claiming to act under congressional directive.284
Citizens, accordingly, are left with no one willing to accept responsibility for
the unpopular or controversial decision.
The structural view purports to protect states’ “retained sovereignty” by
allowing them to “remain independent and autonomous within their proper
sphere of authority.”285 Compelling, commandeering, or leaving states with
no real choice but to participate in a federal regulatory program “reduce[s]
the states to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.”286 But, I suggest that
denying states the option to implement a federal program, especially when
attractive, yet onerous, incentives are offered, undermines states’ autonomy
by disallowing them to freely and voluntarily enter certain “contracts” with
the federal government.
If federalism is viewed as a contract, then states are entitled to assume
responsibility for administering, funding, or implementing federal regulatory
programs if doing so is in their interest. The baseline is that states, not the
federal government, hold the entitlement to deny federal government use of
a state regulatory apparatus.287 Under this view, state autonomy and
reserved powers are preserved because states make the choice. They can
freely refuse to participate but can also freely agree to assume federal
282. Id. at 181-82.
283. See Zelinsky, supra note 213, at 482 (“Federal spending conditions frequently blur
lines of accountability, making it difficult for citizens to discern who is making the policy
impacting upon them.”), 485 (“New York v. United States reflects an understanding that
federally-imposed mandates improperly reduce the accountability of officeholders, forcing
state and local officials to bear the political costs of decisions made in Washington.”); RoseAckerman, supra note 182, at 1347 (suggesting that conditional spending legislation “is
relatively easy for Congrss [sic] to pass because legislators can take credit for bold, new
initiatives without having to face up to the problem of finding tax money to cover the costs of
those programs”); Cover, supra note 224, at 1343 (“By debilitating, if not disarming, the
alternative sources of political power in our federal structure, ‘cooperative federalism’
undermines the only viable restraint on the congressional exercise of enumerated powers: the
political process.”).
284. See New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83.
285. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997).
286. Brown v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975).
287. See Hills, supra note 5, at 822-23.
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powers. The structural view, by contrast, denies states the entitlement to
assume powers considered in the exclusive province of the federal
government, based on formal constitutional grounds, and removes from
states’ consideration a whole range of potentially attractive programs and
incentives.
Applied to the clawback, however, the States made a valid argument
under the commandeering line of cases. As discussed above under the
Dole limits,288 the clawback passed the line between pressure and coercion
because states received no notice of the new condition on Medicaid
participation. States have to pay the demanded clawback amount, with no
opportunity to review, object to, or appeal the demand to perpetually
support an expansive and expensive new federal benefit. The only choice
remaining to states that do not wish to pay is to cease participation in the
Medicaid program and decline all federal monies. That option is practically
impossible for most states from humanitarian, budgetary, and liability
perspectives. Accordingly, the clawback is an unconstitutional exercise of
federal spending power.

E.

Commerce Power

Although not directly on point but still useful to the analysis, Supreme
Court cases on the limits of the commerce power delineate federal and state
governments’ respective powers. United States v. Lopez brought a sea
change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence by invalidating a congressional
enactment under the commerce power, for the first time in nearly sixty
years.289 Lopez involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990,290 a federal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause that made
possessing a firearm in a school zone a federal crime. The Court struck
down the law on the ground that possession of firearms within a school zone

288. See supra Part IV.A (describing alternative argument that States could not proffer,
without contradicting intergovernmental tax immunity argument).
289. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court’s decision in
NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), is generally regarded as the case in
which the Court began to move away from a restrictive definition of interstate commerce and
towards the “zenith” of the commerce power under Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
See McAllister, supra note 193, at 217 (“In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court of the
United States, for the first time in a long time, held that Congress had exceeded its
constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause . . . .”), 223-24 (discussing the
Commerce Clause “Modern Era,” beginning with Jones & Laughlin and culminating in
Wickard v. Filburn); see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
106-07 (Foundation Press 16th ed.).
290. 18 U.S.C. §922(q) (1994), invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
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did not have a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.291 Thus, the law
exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and unconstitutionally
encroached on states’ police powers.292 Subsequent congressional attempts
to regulate social problems have met a similar fate.293
Like the spending power cases, the commerce power cases struggle to
define the line between federal enumerated and state reserved powers. For
many years, the test was whether the area of regulation fell within
Activities typical of state and local
“traditional state powers.”294
governments include fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks. Accordingly, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the
Court held that federal laws mandating employment terms could not apply
to state and local employees because employer-employee relationships
were within states’ traditional powers.295
Several years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,296 the Court overruled Usery and rejected the traditional state
powers distinction as unworkable.297 The Court “reject[ed], as unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”298 The Usery test left too
many gray areas and failed to allow for state powers to evolve over time.
After rejecting that approach, the Court held that federal fair labor
standards did not violate the federal commerce power, even as applied to
states.299

291. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61. But see Filburn, 317 U.S. at 128 (holding that homegrown wheat could be regulated under commerce power “substantial effects” test).
292. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568, 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing structural
limits of federal power and states’ reserved powers).
293. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down federal
Violence Against Women Act); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921-22
(discussing constitutional system of dual sovereignty). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005) (holding that Congress may ban use of marijuana even where states have deemed it
legal for medicinal uses).
294. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (striking down federal
minimum wage and maximum hour standards as applied to states and their subdivisions).
295. Id. at 851-52; McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 93-94 (discussing “traditional
governmental functions” test and suggesting that Usery was the only case in which the Court
used it to invalidate national legislation).
296. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding application of federal minimum wage and overtime
pay laws to metropolitan transit authority); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 94-96
(suggesting that Usery “was destined for failure from the start”).
297. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-47.
298. Id. at 546-47.
299. Id. at 548, 554.
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Garcia offered a different approach to determining limits on federal
power to regulate states, suggesting that the limits inhere in the federal
government’s structure, particularly the representative Congress and political
process. Rather than defining the scope of federal power through judicially
created limitations, the Court suggested that “[s]tate sovereign interests . . .
are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system.”300 The Court asserted that states are
adequately protected at the federal level through elected representatives
who participate in one branch of the federal government.301 The Court
demonstrated this approach’s effectiveness in preserving state sovereignty by
noting that states have obtained substantial federal funding for a range of
“traditional” state services, including “police and fire protection, education,
public health and hospitals, parks and recreation, and sanitation.”302 In
other words, state representatives were politically effective in securing
advantages for their citizens. If the political system functions as intended,
there should be no need to carve out a rigid zone of protection for
traditional state functions.303 States, through their elected congressional
representatives, should be able to freely lobby and vote for laws that would
best serve them and their constituents.304
The more flexible Garcia test for the scope of state and federal powers is
consistent with the contractual view of federalism, which supports states’
autonomy to accept or decline federal incentives to enact certain regulations
or acquiesce to federal powers to enforce a federal law.305 But it does not
relegate states’ powers to only the “traditional” state functions identified by
the Court in prior cases.306 Although Garcia suggests that the structure of
government is the source of the protection for state sovereignty, it is not an
inflexible rule.307 Separation of powers and representative democracy are
the structural basis, instead of an arbitrary definition of what states
traditionally do.308

300. Id. at 552.
301. Id.; see also McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 123 (“Dole in effect relegates
disputes over relative spheres of authority to the political process.”).
302. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-53.
303. See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 196, at 94.
304. Id. at 96-97 (characterizing Garcia “as a return to the delegation construct” and
shifting “focus not upon whether the enactment infringed some core state power, but upon
whether the enactment was a proper subject of federal regulation.”).
305. See supra Part IV.A.2. (discussing contractual view of federalism).
306. See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R. 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (operation of railroads not traditional state
function).
307. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554; Smith, supra note 254, at 1202, 1213.
308. Smith, supra note 254, at 1213.
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If protection of state sovereignty rides on the federal system’s structure,
then it is even more important that states’ elected representatives receive
clear, unambiguous notice of the terms of the “contract” offered so they can
make an informed decision to accept or decline it. Accordingly, the
Pennhurst “clear statement” limit on cooperative federal-state legislation is
essential to the Garcia approach.309
A state representative cannot
adequately protect state sovereignty if he or she is unaware of the terms of a
proposal that requires states to enforce or enact federal laws.
The clawback seems to violate both the old Usery traditional state
functions test and Garcia’s structural approach to federalism. As the States’
Petition argued, managing budgets and appropriations for state programs
are core state functions.310 Those processes may be even more traditional
state powers than managing public-employee working conditions and terms,
which was the power at issue in Usery. Accordingly, the clawback would
readily fail the Usery limit on federal power.
The clawback also runs afoul of federalism under Garcia’s structuralpolitical approach. Members of Congress could not effectively serve their
constituents’ interests without clear, prior notice of the clawback condition
on Medicaid participation when the Social Security Act was passed and
states agreed to accept federal dollars based on the conditions therein.
Regarding the enactment of the clawback itself, states were represented in
Congress when the MMA was debated and finalized.311 But the clawback
was an eleventh-hour amendment that ran awry of both the Senate and
House versions of the bill.312 Although the MMA calls it the “phased down
state percentage,” the clawback was, perhaps, more accurately
characterized in the legislative history as the “phased-in” assumption of
federal administrative costs of the new drug benefit.313 Despite the statutory
language, the MMA’s proponents never intended to phase out states’
substantial funding requirement or shift the cost of the federal benefit to the
federal budget.314 If a federal program’s conditions are not made clear to
states, the political process “check” on federal power, endorsed by Garcia,
fails to protect state sovereignty. Just as Dole and Pennhurst require clear
notice of conditions on federal grants, Garcia requires clear notice of the
309. Id. at 1202-03 (suggesting that “Pennhurst’s clear statement rule . . . ensures that the
structural protections on which the Court relied in Garcia operate properly”); see also supra
notes 221-236 and accompanying text (describing Pennhurst and Dole limits on conditional
spending power).
310. See supra Part III.B. (describing the States’ substantive arguments).
311. See generally Louise M. Slaughter, supra note 26 (describing the political process that
passed Part D).
312. See supra Part II (describing legislative history of clawback).
313. See Weissert & Miller, supra note 7, at 136-37.
314. Id.
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terms of legislation for the constitutional limits on federal power to operate
effectively. The clawback, thus, violates state sovereignty under both
analyses.
V. CLAWBACK FEDERALISM
In sum, the MMA clawback is a departure from traditional “cooperative
federalism” legislation in several respects. First, it inverts the usual funding
relationship. In conditional spending legislation, the federal government
offers money to states as incentive to implement federal regulatory priorities
and encourage “enlarged activity” in state programs consistent with the
federal agenda. These federal grants allow states to pursue policies that
they otherwise might not have been able to achieve at the state level.315
While under the original Medicaid Act, states may receive federal funds to
match state money spent on Medicaid programs, under the clawback, states
give money to the federal government to support an enlarged and overbudget federal program. In addition, the clawback may compromise state
programs because state funds have to be re-allocated to satisfy the federal
payment demand.
The clawback also undermines accountability at both the federal and
state levels.316 The federal government insulated itself from backlash about
Part D’s price tag by shifting a substantial portion of the cost to the states.
States face potential objections from state residents about the program’s
cost but have no way of responding to constituents’ objections or effectively
managing their state budgets under the clawback. Thus, the clawback
exceeds structural and political checks on federal power and leaves states
powerless to meet their residents’ interests.317
Furthermore, the clawback denies states autonomy. The formula and
factors for calculating the clawback are wholly within federal authorities’
control. The statute does not provide a means to challenge or appeal the
demand and denies states any administrative or budgetary discretion with
respect to the payment. If states do not pay, the amount due is
automatically extracted from their federal Medicaid matching dollars.
States have no real choice but to pay the clawback. The only way to
avoid paying it is to opt out of Medicaid altogether. Choosing this option,
however, would force states to fully fund their existing Medicaid programs
without federal financial support or drastically reduce or eliminate benefits,
on pain of possible liability to program beneficiaries and providers. Thus,

315. Strong, supra note 132, at 501-02.
316. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (describing accountability objections to
conditional spending programs and citing sources).
317. See supra notes 298-316 and accompanying text.
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the clawback seems to exceed Congress’s spending power because it gives
states no choice but to comply with a condition on federal grants.318
Because states have no real choice, the clawback violates the contract
view of federalism. Whether construed as a mandatory tax, commandeering
of state budgetary processes, or a condition that lacks a clear statement or
operates retroactively, the clawback is not a valid exercise of the federal
power to tax and spend for the general welfare. The contract notion of
federalism presumes that states hold the entitlement to accept or refuse to
take on federal regulatory responsibilities.319 Although not structurally
barred from doing so, states can validly agree to enter such a contract only
if clearly informed of the terms, in advance. The clawback violates the basic
contract by leaving states without notice of the contract terms and no real
choice about whether to accept them.
The structural view of federalism is also violated. Just as the structural
separation of powers under the Constitution prohibits Congress from
delegating federal legislative power to executive branch authorities,
structural federalism limits in the Constitution prohibit the federal
government from delegating federal powers and obligations to states, even
if states chose to accept them.320 With the clawback, Congress delegated to
the states the responsibility for appropriations to expand federal health and
welfare programs. Providing the funds for a federal program seems to fall
clearly within the federal powers and, thus, cannot constitutionally be
assigned to the states.
VI. CONCLUSION
Medicaid is a traditional conditional funding program and represents an
established, relatively uncontroversial example of cooperative federalism.
States agree to implement state healthcare programs consistent with broad
federal guidelines in exchange for federal funding. The conditional funding
approach respects state sovereignty by allowing states to refuse to
participate as long as they are willing to turn down the federal dollars. The
clawback, however, differs significantly from traditional conditional funding
structures and disrupts the accepted cooperative federalism structures of the
Medicaid program. States agreed to establish their state programs under
the assumption that they would receive federal matching dollars, on a
percentage basis, for every state dollar spent on Medicaid, including
medical care and prescription drugs for dually eligible beneficiaries. The
clawback alters the federal end of the bargain because states no longer
318. See supra Parts III.B.2. & IV.D. (describing Dole and commandeering arguments).
319. See supra Part IV.A.2. (describing Hills’ “functional” theory of federalism).
320. See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text (describing non-delegation doctrine
analogy).
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receive a portion of promised federal funding, namely the federal dollars
based on dually eligible beneficiaries’ prescription drug costs. Moreover,
states now must pay the federal government for the entire cost of dual
eligibles’ drugs. Adding insult to injury, states that refuse or are unable to
pay the clawback lose all federal Medicaid funding.
Recent state healthcare reform efforts to achieve universal coverage and
federal proposals to expand government programs and coordinate tax and
other market incentives with state plans will likely raise additional, unique
cooperative federalism questions.321 With the Part D clawback, the federal
government sought to claim credit for implementing broad national
healthcare reforms while leaving the financial burden of the sweeping new
benefit on states. Similar legislation seems likely, given the continuing
healthcare funding challenges and demand for reform. Therefore, the
clawback provision merits closer analysis than the Supreme Court’s cursory
denial or review, even if states do not pursue the litigation in lower courts,
before Congress implements similar mechanisms in the current wave of
reform efforts.

321. For a discussion of similar federalism implications for watershed healthcare reform
efforts under the Clinton Administration, see Rich & White, supra note 115, at 861-62 (“As a
society, we have witnessed several negotiations and renegotiations over what the appropriate
or proper mix should be between federal, state, and local government ‘interventions,’ on the
one hand, and the role of the private sector and the free market, on the other.”).
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